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The objection that a warlike device is barbarous has always been made against new weapons, which have
nevertheless eventually been adopted.
Captain Alfred Mahan, USN1

I.

INTRODUCTION

H

istorical attempts to regulate weapons through the law of war include
examples of both relative success and spectacular failure. Some attempts at
weapons regulation have succeeded quite easily, with swift, widespread and
enduring agreement followed by reasonably steadfast implementation. Other
1. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES:
THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 366 (1920). Captain Mahan served as a lecturer at and later
as president of the U.S. Naval War College.
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attempts, even with respect to apparently similar technologies, have failed
despite persistent and well-resourced campaigns. Still other endeavors have
managed to attract initial agreement, but later proved wholly inadequate in
the demanding conditions of armed conflict. This mixed record begs explanation. Yet even with the benefit of extensive records of State practice and
relatively complete archives of diplomatic proceedings, no theory currently
accounts for how weapons law develops under the law of war. This article
develops a deepened understanding of the processes and forces that have
historically formed weapons law with a view to improving predictions of
future advances in this critical area of conflict regulation.
In general, the law of war regulates emerging technologies and existing
weapons in two ways. Primarily, States have resorted to generally applicable
principles and limitations to regulate weapon technology and use. These
principles have crystallized through evolutions in custom, comprised of
prolonged State practice and periodic, though increasingly rare, expressions
of opinio juris.2 Many of these principles are now codified in treaties. They
also find form in increasingly fine-tuned military legal doctrine applicable
to weapons.3 This article begins by identifying the law of war principles
most relevant to weapons law and presenting the historical record of their
refinement and implementation by States. While law of war principles have
proved enduring and flexible guides to the lawfulness of weapons, their
ambiguity and abstract content will be shown in Part II to have greatly limited their regulatory effect, as well as their predictive value for advances in
weapons law.
In addition to principles, States have employed rules to either ban or
limit the use, possession, production and transfer of very specific technologies of war. As with law of war principles, rules for specific weapons take
the form of either treaty or custom. And like principles, specific regulations
are found in military legal and tactical doctrine. However, rather than regulate generally, rules address themselves to specific weapons or, at most,
families of weapons. Their formation generally involves far more deliberate
and careful attention on the part of States. This article catalogs a wide
range of efforts by States, international organizations, and non2. See generally Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 189 (2015).
3. See, e.g., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK 11–15 (2014) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY OPLAW HANDBOOK] (providing
U.S. military lawyers instructions on the operation of five law of war principles).
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governmental organizations (NGOs) to regulate weapons by means of specific prohibitions or limitations on use. Particular attention is paid to points
of disagreement at weapons conferences and concerns that have prevented
States from accepting weapons law proposals. Part III reveals a highly diverse experience, with sporadic and what may seem at times capricious enthusiasm for specific regulations on the part of States.
This article concludes with an effort to distill from the preceding historical records, a deeper understanding of how weapons law forms under
the law of war. Part IV suggests that a number of qualities of weapon technologies themselves contribute in great part to the prospects of regulatory
success or failure. Careful examination of the historical record reveals the
existence of both regulation-tolerant weapons and regulation-resistant
weapons, identifiable by a number of criteria, including effectiveness, novelty, deployment, medical compatibility, disruptiveness and notoriety. These criteria are presented both to explain and inform existing weapons law,
and also to facilitate efforts to identify weapons and emerging technology
that may prove susceptible to law of war regulation, as well as technologies
that will likely resist regulation.
II. WEAPONS AND LAW OF WAR PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL LIMITATIONS
The principles of the law of war reflect a form of standing consent to international regulation of weapons. All weapons, regardless of their nature
or novelty, are subject to each of the principles of the law of war.4 No further expression of consent by States is required to apply law of war principles to new weapons. Some of the most widely accepted law of war principles are military necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and humanity or
unnecessary suffering.5 A fifth principle known alternatively as honor or
chivalry is also frequently mentioned. This principle generally prohibits
4. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 86 (July 8) (noting “the newness of nuclear weapons has been expressly rejected as an argument against the application to them of international humanitarian law”).
See also TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE r.
20, at 75 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (concluding that the law of war applies to “cyber
operations conducted in the context of an armed conflict”).
5. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL §§ 2.1–2.6 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]; U.S. NAVY,
U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB
P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 5.3
(2007) [hereinafter NAVY COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].
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conduct and weapons that involve treachery or bad faith deceit in war.6
Despite their universal application and near-universal acceptance, recitations of these law of war principles are surprisingly inconsistent with respect to scope and content.7 In fact, much of the indeterminacy that accompanies law of war weapons regulation is attributable to the vagueness,
abstraction and uncertainty associated with these principles.
The principles of unnecessary suffering, discrimination and honor have
been regarded as particularly relevant to weapons law.8 Today, application
6. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 14–15; OFFICE OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADA, B-GJ-005-104/FP-021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 202.7 (2001) [hereinafter CANADIAN MANUAL]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 3 (1956) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10]. See also MICHAEL BOTHE,
KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 233 (2d ed. revision by Michael Bothe, 2013); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 226–27 (1944) (describing the principle of chivalry as
introducing a “certain amount of fairness in offence and defence, and a certain mutual
respect”).
7. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified on three occasions three maxims of the law
of war, including “humanity, moderation, and honor.” Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191
(1877); In re The Amy Warwick, The Schooner Crenshaw, The Barque Hiawatha, The
Schooner Brilliante (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1862); Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 3 LE DROIT DE GENS OU
PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE ch. 18, §§ 294–95 (1758). The U.S. DoD Law of War
Manual includes five principles: military necessity, humanity, discrimination, proportionality and honor. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2.2–2.6 (2015). See also UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT ¶¶ 2.2–2.6 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL] (identifying military necessity,
humanity, distinction and proportionality); CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 202.1
(identifying military necessity, humanity and chivalry); FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL, ¶¶ 141–42 (2013) [hereinafter GERMAN MANUAL], available at http://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=56
16055 (identifying military necessity and humanity); U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10,
supra note 6, ¶ 3(a) (identifying necessity, humanity and chivalry as basic principles). A
casebook published by the International Committee of the Red Cross identifies six principles of international humanitarian law: humanity, necessity, proportionality, distinction,
prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering and independence of jus in bello from jus ad
bellum. 1 MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE QUINTIN, HOW DOES LAW
PROTECT IN WAR? Part I, ch. 4, 10–14 (3d ed. 2011), available at https://www.icrc.org
/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf.
8. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 103 (1975) [hereinafter LUCERNE REPORT] (citing among documents distributed at the 1974 Lucerne Con544
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of these three principles to weapons takes place primarily through States’
internal legal reviews of weapons.9 In this vein, Article 36 of Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides,
In the study, development acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.

A few words about how law of war principles and two important precepts concerning public conscience and the environment operate in practice will illustrate the role they play in regulating weapons and weapon
technology. At the same time, however, the persistent ambiguity of each
principle will become clear, revealing the limits of their capacity to impose
restraints on States’ resort to new weapons.
A. Unnecessary Suffering
The law of war principle perhaps most closely associated with international
regulation of weapons and military technology is the prohibition of unnecference a report from an expert from the United Kingdom entitled “Legal Criteria for the
Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Categories of Conventional Weapons”); Frits Kalshoven, Arms, Armaments, and International Law, 191 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 183, 324 (1985-II) [hereinafter Kalshoven, Arms] (citing Colonel
David Hughes-Morgan’s paper submitted to the 1974 Lucerne Conference).
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. See, e.g., Deputy Secretary of Defense, DODD 5000.01, The
Defense Acquisition System ¶ E1.1.15 (2003). The United States further implements the
customary international law obligation to conduct legal reviews of weapons through service-specific regulations. See Judge Advocate General, Department of the Air Force,
AFI51-402, Legal Reviews of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities (2011); Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (RD&A), Department of the Navy, SECNAVINST 5000.2C, Implementation
and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System ¶ 2.6 (2004); Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 27-53,
Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law (1979). For a detailed perspective
on weapons reviews under 1977 Additional Protocol I Article 36 and customary international law, see W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55 (2005) [hereinafter Parks, Weapons Reviews]. For
an example of a U.S. weapon review, see W. Hays Parks, Joint Service Combat Shotgun Program, THE ARMY LAWYER, Oct. 1997, at 16.
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essary suffering, or humanity as it is also known. International codification
of the principle of unnecessary suffering is traceable to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, regarded by many as the first multilateral law of war
weapons treaty. In addition to its ban on small caliber exploding projectiles,
the 1868 Declaration condemned “employments of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men” as “contrary to the laws of humanity.”10 Multiple, subsequent law of war instruments and treaties have
since reiterated and confirmed the principle. It is widely agreed that the
principle of unnecessary suffering is not only a treaty obligation, but also
reflects customary international law binding on all States.11
While acknowledgment of the principle has long been practically universal, agreement on the precise meaning and operational limits imposed
by the prohibition of unnecessary suffering has not.12 For instance, a translational issue arose concerning the scope of weapons addressed by the
principle early in its history. As stated in the 1874 Brussels Declaration, a
non-binding though foundational document for later treaties, the principle

10. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474 [hereinafter 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration]. In the spirit of the
Declaration’s phrasing, some sources refer to a principle of “humanity” in lieu of unnecessary suffering. See also UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶¶ 2.1, 2.4.
11. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8); 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 70, at 237 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CIL STUDY]; Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of
Superfluous Injury of Unnecessary Suffering, 34 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS
98, 103 (1994) (judging the customary status of the Hague codification of unnecessary
suffering to be “well established”). The ICRC’s customary law study also asserts the principle of unnecessary suffering applies beyond the rationae materiae of the treaties governing
international armed conflict from which it is drawn. ICRC CIL STUDY, supra, at 237. According to the study, unnecessary suffering applies as a matter of custom to noninternational armed conflicts. Id.
12. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 403 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter 1977 AP COMMENTARY] (observing that
the principle of unnecessary suffering was never contested during the several conferences
of experts that led to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, although
no “wide-ranging agreement on its significance and scope” could be attained). See also LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. This report captured the view of some experts assembled to study the possibility of generating weapons regulations who viewed the term “unnecessary suffering” as objectionable in that all suffering in war was unnecessary. Id.
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prohibits weapons “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”13 The ordinary meaning of the phrase “calculated to” suggested an element of deliberate design or specific intent. Weapons purposely devised to inflict injury
beyond that required to accomplish military objectives—most commonly
destruction of materiel or rendering combatants hors de combat—violate the
principle under this meaning. Weapons that incidentally, unintentionally or
accidentally inflict unnecessary suffering seem outside the ambit of the
principle.
Drawn in large part from the 1874 Declaration, the 1899 Hague Convention’s annexed Regulations included an expression of the principle of
unnecessary suffering. However, the English translation of the official
French version inexplicably abandoned the term “calculated to cause” in
favor of the term “of a nature to cause.” The change presented an interesting interpretive dilemma, at least for English-speaking lawyers. Ordinary
canons of interpretation counsel lawyers to render distinct meanings to different terms and phrases. Although the relevant phrases appear in separate
legal instruments, the direct lineage between the Brussels Declaration and
1899 Hague Regulations is indisputable. Therefore, some accounting of the
change of phrase between instruments certainly seemed in order. The term
“nature” referred in this context to the essential qualities or properties of a
thing; the inherent and inseparable combination of properties . . . giving it
its fundamental character.”14 Accordingly, resort to the term “of a nature
to” seemed to shift the focus of legal reviews of weapons under the unnecessary suffering principle away from the intentions of States and weapon
designers and toward the inherent qualities of weapons. Analyses under the
“of a nature to” standard might require not only consideration of the
weapons designers’ intended effects, but also a more thorough examination
of the likely and even possible range of injuries that could result from a
weapon’s normal battlefield use. Under this articulation, unintentional, incidental and even accidental infliction of unnecessary suffering might well
run afoul of the principle. Efforts to shift analyses of unnecessary suffering
to effects of weapons, rather than intended design, have proved difficult to
implement and have drawn significant criticism and reservations from

13. Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
Brussels art. 13(e), Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 23 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 1874 Brussels Declaration]
(emphasis added).
14. VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 41 (1978).
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States.15 Adding to confusion, the English translation of the 1907 Hague
Regulations returned to the phrase “calculated to cause,” although the official French expression remained unchanged.16 Indeed, to French speakers,
the entire debate itself must seem somewhat “unnecessary.”
In 1997, in response to nearly a century of ambiguity surrounding the
principle, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) initiated
the Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering (SIrUS) Project.17 The
SIrUS Project was notable in two respects. First, it introduced a fresh perspective on analyses of the longstanding prohibition on unnecessary suffering. Where previous application of the prohibition had examined the intent
of parties employing a weapon or the weapon’s intended design or nature,
the SIrUS Project proposed examining weapons’ effects exclusively. Relying heavily on medical reports of survival rates and the state of widely
available field medical treatments, the Project then proposed to ban weapons that produced the most severe or untreatable wounds. The Project’s
authors purported to supplant subjective State intent to cause unnecessary
suffering with an objective medical perspective on the inherent characteristics of weapons.18
The Project drew from a large ICRC database of war wounds. Parameters included “the proportion of large wounds; mortality; the relative proportion of central and limb injuries; the duration of hospital stay; the number of operations required; the requirement for blood transfusion; and the
extent of severe and permanent disability in the survivors.”19 The Project
then correlated these medical parameters with the foreseeable effects of
various weapons, but especially small arms bullets. The Project identified
four criteria, the presence of any one of which was sufficient to indicate a
weapon caused unnecessary suffering.20

15. Donna M. Verchio, Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well-intentioned, but Unnecessary
and Superfluous, 51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 183, 200 n.84 (2001) (describing State reactions to the ICRC’s SIrUS proposal).
16. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(a), annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
17. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE SIRUS PROJECT: TOWARDS A DETERMINATION OF WHICH WEAPONS CAUSE “SUPERFLUOUS INJURY OR UNNECESSARY SUFFERING” (1997).
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 23. The four criteria are weapons whose foreseeable effects include:
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Apart from appearing to resort to objective criteria, the proposal had
the additional benefit of reflecting recent codification of the unnecessary
suffering prohibition. Where, as noted above, prior understandings and
codifications of unnecessary suffering had prohibited weapons “calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering,”21 the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions prohibited weapons “of a nature to cause . . . unnecessary suffering.”22 Whichever historical account of the principle forbidding unnecessary suffering proved correct, the SIrUS Project purported to better capture the letter of the ascendant articulation of the law.
Scientific debate and technical quarrels, however, plagued the nascent
Project. Beyond objections to resorting exclusively to effects to evaluate
unnecessary suffering, States raised a number of methodological questions
concerning the data on which the Project relied. That wound data were derived from ICRC rather than military medical hospitals meant the majority
of wounds analyzed were to civilians, who lacked medical training, equipment and personnel that usually accompany armed forces and perform first
response aid.23 By 2001, the ICRC abandoned the SIrUS Project and with it
further attempts to reduce the abstraction of the principle.24
More than a century after its first codification, vindication of the customary term “calculated to” came (momentarily) in the form of international criminal law. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council created
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.25 The Tribunal’s statute criminalizes “employment of poisonous weapons or other
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”26 However, less than ten
years later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), a
standing tribunal with jurisdiction over certain war crimes, codified the
principle of unnecessary suffering as “employing weapons, projectiles and
(1) specific disease, specific abnormal physiological state, specific abnormal psychological
state, specific and permanent disability or specific disfigurement; (2) field mortality of
more than 25% or a hospital mortality of more than 5%; (3) Grade 3 wounds as measured
by the Red Cross wound classification; or (4) effects for which there is no well recognized
and proven treatment.

Id.
21. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, art. 23(e) (emphasis added).
22. AP I, supra note 9, art. 35(2) (emphasis added).
23. Verchio, supra note 15, at 200 n.84.
24. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 88.
25. S.C Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
26. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 3(a),
S.C. Res. 827 annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]
(emphasis added).
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material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering.”27
Still, the legal status of the ICC Statute’s provision on unnecessary suffering is dubious. The Rome Statute places entry into force of its unnecessary suffering provision on hold. The relevant article is only enforceable
“provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an
annex to this Statute . . . .” This compromise was necessary to secure
agreement among States and likely reflects the unsettled and wide-ranging
views on the principle of unnecessary suffering.28 To date, States have not
produced the annex of weapons agreed to cause unnecessary suffering required by the Statute to activate the Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, the elements of war crimes do not address unnecessary suffering because no
such annex has been produced.29 It seems then that prosecution of the
principle of unnecessary suffering is at present not within the jurisdiction
of the Court—a significant gap in the Court’s power to enforce the law of
war and demonstrative of a glaring lack of State commitment to weapons
law in the international legal system.30
In sum, it is difficult to identify a generally consistent or accepted manner of interpretation or even articulation of the principle of unnecessary
suffering.31 There appears to be consistent agreement that some weapons,
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2.(b)(xx), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Rome Statute] (emphasis added).
28. WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE 243–47 (2010) (relating the negotiating history that produced
Article 8.2(b)(xx)).
29. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 297 (Knut Dörmann et al. eds., 2003).
30. See id.; Judith Gardham, Crimes Involving Disproportionate Means and Methods of Warfare
under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IGOR BLISHCHENKO 537,
555 (José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 2009).
31. See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT DESKBOOK 155 (2014) (instructing “[t]here is no agreed upon definition for
unnecessary suffering”); UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 6.1.2 (noting “the law does not define unnecessary suffering, and views can differ markedly”); id ¶ 6.1.4; 1977 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 410; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
8 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 LUGANO REPORT] (noting long-standing dispute over the
meaning of unnecessary suffering).
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by their nature, cause unnecessary suffering. States have identified weapons
employing fragments that evade detection by x-ray, poison and barbed
weapons as inflicting needless injury.32 Ultimately, however, the linguistic
variations and competing interpretations of the principle of unnecessary
suffering may simply reflect the inherent limitations of regulating by resort
to principles. As the subsequent principles demonstrate, law of war principles regulate in a very general manner, often relying to a greater degree on
States’ fidelity to the spirit and purpose of the law rather than to its letter.
B. Discrimination33
No law of war principle enjoys wider acknowledgment than the principle
of discrimination.34 At its simplest, the principle of discrimination requires
belligerents to maintain a distinction during attacks between combatants
and civilians and between military objectives and civilian objects.35 In each
case, belligerents must limit attacks to the former and safeguard, to the extent practicable, the latter. Although the principle has been honored to

32. ICTY Statute, supra note 26, art. 3(a) (enumerating the crime of “employment of
poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”); NAVY
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, ¶ 9-1; UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.6, 6.11.2;
U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 6, ¶ 34.
33. The term “indiscriminateness” was used by Colonel David Hughes-Morgan to describe how the principle of discrimination applies specifically to legal considerations of
weapons at the earliest conference in the process that led to the prevailing regulatory regime for weapons. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8.
34. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) (recognizing distinction and humanity as cardinal principles of the law of
war).
35. Whether the principle of discrimination—and many other law of war principles
and rules of precautions in attack—applies to operations during armed conflict that do not
amount to attacks is unsettled. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context, in 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER
CONFLICT 283, 289–90 (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Katarine Ziolkowski eds., 2012)
(defining the notion of attack by reference to “violence” and interpreting “attack” as a
threshold of application for targeting rules); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT:
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICT 37 (2011) (asserting that principles of the law of war, including military
necessity and discrimination, apply to all operations, even those short of attack, during
armed conflict).
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greatly varying degrees in twentieth century combat,36 its status as lex lata is
firm, cemented by numerous clear treaty provisions and confirmed by the
judgments of recent international criminal law tribunals.37
Discrimination figured early in modern efforts to regulate combat. Little if any disagreement arose concerning the principle’s application to attacks and methods of warfare. By the early 1970s, however, a dispute contested the extent to which the principle applied to weapons and means of
warfare per se. Although experts agreed easily that no weapon could be
lawfully employed in an indiscriminate manner or method, the question
whether a weapon or means of warfare itself could be regarded as inherently indiscriminate proved more contentious.38 Some experts considered that
discrimination only regulated how weapons were used and that no weapon
could be preemptively categorized as violating the principle simply by virtue of its nature or properties. At minimum, these experts argued a weapon-focused application of the principle had not yet crystallized into positive
law. Other experts contended that indiscriminateness could take the form
of a prohibition of weapons that “cannot be accurately directed against military targets” simply by virtue of their properties and regardless of the intention of the parties employing them.39
Vindication of the expansive, now-prevailing view of discrimination
with respect to weapons did not take long (at least not by law of war development standards). Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions addresses the principles of the law of war, including intricate
treatment of the principle of discrimination. The Protocol articulates a separate dimension of discrimination specifically applicable to weapons
36. See, e.g., PERTTI JOENNIEMI & ALLAN ROSAS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND INTEREST CONFIGURATIONS ON THE EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CRITERIA FOR THE CHOICE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN WAR 26 (1975). Joenniemi and Rosas report civilian combat losses at about 5 percent of total casualties in
World War I, at 50 percent in World War II, at 70–80 percent in the Vietnam War and
somewhat lower in hostilities in the Middle East in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Id. at 26
n. 1.
37. AP I, supra note 9, art. 48; Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeal
Judgment, ¶¶ 190–91 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (identifying the principle of distinction); Prosecutor v. Blaški , Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal
Judgment, ¶¶ 109, 113 n.220, 157 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 29,
2004) (describing customary duties of discrimination between combatants and civilians).
38. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10–11.
39. Id.
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through provisions widely regarded largely to reflect custom.40 To the question whether the principle of discrimination regulates weapons per se, Article 51(4) states in relevant part, “Indiscriminate attacks are: . . . (b) those
which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of
combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol.”41
Frequently cited examples of weapons that violate the principle of discrimination per se are certain missiles42 and bacteriological weapons.43 Missiles and rockets that lack guidance systems or involve a wide radius of impact error are thought to be indiscriminate because they cannot reliably be
aimed at military objectives. A highly respected analysis of AP I, Article
51(4)(b) also cites “‘blind’ weapons” as examples of means that do not
comply.44 The authors include as specific examples of blind or indiscriminate means, “[a]ttaching incendiary or antipersonnel bombs to free floating
balloons” and “[l]and mines, laid without customary precautions.”45
Biological and some chemical weapons are generally judged to be indiscriminate by virtue of the uncontrollable nature of their effects under the
AP I, Article 51(4)(c) standard. Many biological agents are capable of reproduction and may spread well beyond their intended targets. Some
chemical weapons may be scattered beyond their objectives by unpredictable atmospheric conditions. Significant debate exists whether nuclear
weapons are inherently indiscriminate or incapable of being directed at a
specific military objective. Although the International Court of Justice was
unable to conclude in an advisory opinion that nuclear weapons were illegal
per se, the Court advised at minimum that their use remained conditioned
by the law of war principle of distinction.46

40. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 6.7.2, 6.7.4.
41. AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(4) (emphasis added).
42. UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 6.4.1. (citing German V1 flying bombs and Scud
missiles used by the Iraqi armed forces during the Persian Gulf conflict of 1991); CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 509 (citing Scud missiles as examples of weapons that cannot be directed at a specific legitimate target).
43. CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 6, ¶ 516 (citing bacteriological/biological weapons as “affecting the civilian population in an indiscriminate fashion”).
44. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 6, at 346.
45. Id.
46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 86 (July 8).
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C. Honor
Honor, the final fundamental principle considered in the legality of weapons, concerns longstanding notions of noble warfare. The principle of
honor has a complicated history in the regulation of not only conduct, but
also of weapons deemed acceptable by belligerents. Article 23(b) of the
1907 Hague Regulations forbids parties to “kill or wound treacherously
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.” The generality of the
expression is difficult to explain and leaves much to interpretation. The
term “honor” even fell out of use in U.S. military legal doctrine, although it
has recently been revived.47 For most of its history, States seemed content
to leave determinations of honor to subjective interpretation. Later codifications of the principle, however, eliminated some ambiguity, but not
without arguably narrowing the principle’s traditionally broad scope of
coverage.48
Today, honor is codified as the widely acknowledged war crime of perfidy.49 The most broadly accepted codification of perfidy is the prohibition
found in AP I, Article 37, which states,
It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy.
Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he
is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy:
(a) the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;
(b) the feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
(c) the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status . . . .50

47. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 2.6–2.6.3.2.
48. See generally Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 106 (2014)
(detailing various codifications and refinements of the prohibition of perfidy derived from
more general notions of treachery).
49. ICC Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8.2(b)(xi).
50. The United States does not consider the AP I reference to “capture” as an effect
sufficient to constitute perfidy under customary international law. DOD LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5.22.2.1.
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Recalling the earlier-mentioned debate concerning discrimination, the
AP I expression of perfidy applies far more easily to conduct than to
weapons. While not exhaustive, the listed examples describe conduct and
methods rather than weapons or means of warfare. Addressing permissible
ruses as distinguished from perfidy, AP I delves into means, with mention
of “camouflage, decoys, mock information, and misinformation.” The ambit of AP I perfidy might by negative implication include means or weapons that inherently or by their nature—and especially their appearance—
betray enemy confidence in law of war protection, such as booby trapped
medical supplies or civilian objects. This view is disputed, however, and
likely does not attract unanimous support.51
This view also did not prevail at early weapons review conferences. In
1974, a proposal to address perfidious weapons that failed to secure unanimous support read, “The use of any weapon in such a way that it places
the intended victim under a moral, juridical or humanitarian obligation to
act in such a way as to endanger his safety, is perfidious.”52 Concern
emerged that the terms “moral and juridical or humanitarian obligation”
were too ambiguous to apply or enforce with respect to weapons.53 The
majority of experts preferred to address weapons as being perfidious or
treacherous in certain conditions or when they were employed in a prohibited manner, rather than being inherently so.54
Today, the principle of honor remains perhaps the most ambiguous of
law of war principles applicable to weapons. States appear to remain content with a high degree of abstraction with respect to its content and meaning. All the same, weapons, especially novel weapons, are frequently indicted as treacherous or dishonorable. The weapon most consistently associated with the principle has been poison. Booby traps and other weapons or
means of warfare appearing as innocent objects have frequently been
judged to be treacherous or dishonorable means of warfare per se.55

51. See, e.g., Rogier Bartels, Killing with Military Equipment Disguised as Civilian Objects is
Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 20, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21285/disguising-militaryweapons-civilian-equipment-perfidy-or-be/; Kevin Jon Heller, No, Disguising Military
Equipment as Civilian Objects to Help Kill Isn’t Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://justsecurity.org/21391/no-disguising-military-equipment-civilian-objects-killperfidy/.
52. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 11, 70.
55. Id. at 63–64.
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D. The Martens Clause
In addition to the fundamental principles of the law of war, other very general rules and prohibitions of general application have emerged that bear
on the legality of weapons during armed conflict. The Hague Convention
applicable to land warfare, produced at the First Hague Peace Conference
in 1899, included perhaps the most general of law of war restraints still in
use today. Drafted and proposed by the formidable Russian chief of delegation to the Hague Conference, Fyodor de Martens, the eponymous Martens Clause reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they
result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the
laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience . . . .56

Martens originally submitted the Clause as a consolation to and enticement of support from smaller European States who feared the Hague
treaties would too strictly limit their means of defense against invasion by
stronger military powers.57 The Martens Clause responded to militarily
weak States’ misgivings by guaranteeing the continued operation of the law
of war, thought by these States as a way to preserve means and methods of
defense essential to their survival, especially through resort to unconventional forces and spontaneous resistance by an armed population.
In the nearly 120 years since it first appearance, however, the Clause
has taken on a novel role as law of war gap filler. Resort to the Clause is
made frequently to support not only the persistent and complimentary role
of custom to treaty law, but also the possibility of other legal regimes, such
as international human rights law, operating simultaneously with the law of
war.58 Since 1899, States have included the Clause in a number of major law
of war instruments with this purpose clearly in mind.59
56. Convention No. II Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention II].
57. WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 215–20 (1908).
58. See Michael Salter, Post-war Developments of the Martens Clause: The Codification of
Crimes Against Humanity Applicable to Acts of Genocide, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES 250 (2011); Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf
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One of the chief interpretive difficulties concerning the Martens
Clause, especially as applied to weapons, is whether the Clause carries substantive weight of its own. A view expressed in early weapons law conferences considered the terms “laws of humanity” and “requirements of the
public conscience” as independent legal standards to be applied and enforced separately from other relevant international legal obligations.60 According to this view, all weapons would be reviewed for compliance with
these general and open-natured limitations. States adopting new weapons
would be required to identify workable standards for “laws of humanity”
and presumably measure weapons against these standards. Similarly, and
perhaps more problematically, legal reviews of weapons would require attention to seemingly subjective and malleable public conscience or the even
more fickle standards of public opinion. Today, interpreted as an independent and self-executing obligation, the Martens Clause would prove a
particularly important limitation given that so many weapons, for any
number of reasons, have garnered strong public reactions and condemnation.
A competing view, however, has regarded the Martens Clause more
narrowly—more as a placeholder or clause of incorporation. According to
this view, the terms of the Clause do not constitute legal standards themselves. Instead, they incorporate by reference other norms, requiring a further showing that a norm of international law, separate from those of the

or Simply Pie in the Sky, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2000)
[hereinafter Cassese]; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates
of Public Conscience, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2000).
59. See, e.g., Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539; Convention (I) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 63, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 62, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 142, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 158, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 1977 AP I, supra note 9, art. 1(2); Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-international Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Convention
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects pmbl., Oct. 10,
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1980 CCW].
60. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
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instrument that contains the Clause, provides a rule for decision.61 The
norm in question would thus have to be derived from an independent and
accepted source of international law such as treaty or custom.62 Under this
view, the Clause would incorporate or merely make the clear the continued
application of other rules and norms not included in the instrument or legal
regime under consideration. A further, still narrower view, perhaps closest
to its original intent, denied the Clause legal status at all. This view regarded
it as an entirely non-legal, political statement, reminding State parties that
law is not the exclusive international limitation on their conduct and that
they remain answerable to international politics and opinion.63
A final understanding of the Martens Clause regards the Clause in the
nature of an interpretive guide.64 Rather than attribute independent substantive force, or for that matter mere incorporation of collateral rules, the
interpretive view employs the Clause as a lens through which law of war
and other international law rules are applied during armed conflict. According to this view, the terms humanity and public conscience act as guides for
the application of rules and the resolution of ambiguities.65
For now, it seems non-substantive views of the Martens Clause likely
prevail. The chief function of the Clause today is to remind belligerents of
the many sources of legal restraints in war. It acts somewhat like a reverse
parol evidence clause in contract law.66 If a parol evidence clause limits the
extent of contracting parties’ agreement to terms of a written contract and
prohibits resort to extrinsic evidence of legal obligations, the Martens
Clause constitutes somewhat the reverse—an open-ended incorporation of
the full extent of State parties’ relevant legal obligations. Ultimately, neither
the substantive view nor the prevailing placeholder view accords especially
closely to the original intent or meaning of the Clause, leaving its present—

61. Id. at 12.
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. The Statute is widely regarded as an accurate articulation
of the sources of international law.
63. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
64. Jochen von Bernstorff, Martens Clause, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 13 (Dec. 2009), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view
/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e327.
65. Id. See also Cassese, supra note 58, at 190.
66. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of
Contractual Interpretation, 146 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 533, 535 (1998)
(citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §7.3, at 474 (2d ed. 1990)).
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and perhaps future—meanings for purposes of international weapons law
somewhat unclear.
E. Environmental Effects
A final law of war limitation generally applicable to weapons, which compliments but likely does itself not form part of the fundamental principles
of the law of war, addresses means of warfare and the environment. The
prohibition finds expression in two treaties. First, AP I, Article 35(3) provides, “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment.” Second, the 1976 Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) prohibits “military or any other hostile use
of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other
State party.”67 Ratifications of AP I now total 174 States.68 Seventy-seven
States have ratified ENMOD.69 The ICRC has concluded that the prohibitions of Article 35(3) and ENMOD reflect customary international law applicable to international and, “arguably,” to non-international armed conflicts.70
Two differences between AP I and ENMOD with respect to weapons
regulation merit mention. First, although they share a common concern for
persistent environmental effects of hostilities, AP I and ENMOD regulate
differently. Where AP I addresses weapons that have extreme effects on the
environment, ENMOD forbids converting the environment itself into a
weapon to injure or coerce an enemy. Article II of ENMOD makes clear
that the Convention’s prohibition addresses only “deliberate manipulation
of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the
67. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques art. I, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S
151 [hereinafter 1976 ENMOD].
68. Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/
ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4&action=op
enDocument (last visited June 29, 2015).
69. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=2AC88
FF62DB2CDD6C12563CD002D6EC1&action=openDocument (last visited June 29,
2015).
70. ICRC CIL STUDY, supra note 11, r. 45, at 151.
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Earth.” The difference is important and explains some States’ persistent
objection to AP I, Article 35(3) notwithstanding their ratification of
ENMOD,71 as well as other States’ submissions of understandings with
respect to the AP I provision.72
The United States, for instance, while a party to ENMOD, rejects Article 35(3) as an expression of custom, maintaining that the principles of discrimination and proportionality guard against weapons resulting in excessive incidental environmental damage rather than the Article’s specific prohibition.73 Second, it should be noted that where violation of Article 35(3)
requires cumulative criteria of “widespread, long-term, and severe damage
to the natural environment,” ENMOD enumerates the same criteria disjunctively such that any single effect is sufficient to constitute a breach.
A final consideration regarding weapons and the environment concerns
scope of application. Reminiscent of earlier law of war si omnes clauses,
ENMOD’s prohibition is limited to hostilities among parties.74 ENMOD is
not as widely ratified as many law of war treaties; however, State parties
include admitted and likely nuclear States with the exceptions of France,
Israel and South Africa. It is possible that the customary incarnation of
ENMOD’s prohibition operates without regard to advance reciprocal
commitment, meaning the prohibition would apply universally regardless
of the adversary.
Overall, one finds among the principles of the law of war meaningful
yet pervasively ambiguous and abstract limits on weapons and war technology. The advantages of regulating weapons by resort to principles such
as the prohibitions of unnecessary suffering, indiscriminateness, dishonor
and other rules are clear. General principles offer a flexible and adaptive
71. Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America 24 (June
20, 1995), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8700.pdf (characterizing AP I, Article
35(3) as a “new rule”).
72. Although it has not ratified AP I, the United States submitted a declaration upon
signature stating, “the rules established by this protocol were not intended to have any
effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.” Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions, Reservations and Declarations, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra note 13, at 817. France and the United Kingdom submitted understandings of AP I
Article 35(3) which state, “risk of damage to the natural environment . . . is to be assessed
objectively on the basis of the information available at the time under consideration.” Id.
at 800, 816.
73. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 5, §§ 6.10.3.1, 19.20.1.5.
74. 1976 ENMOD, supra note 67, art. I.
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approach to regulation capable of evolving along with State practice and
the rapid development of new weapons and technology. It is no accident
that these principles have survived as the primary restraints on weapons
despite revolutionary changes in armaments. States clearly approve of and
appreciate the flexibility and, frankly, the degree of autonomy regulation by
resort to broad principles has provided.
Yet it is also clear that regulating weapons by principle entails noteworthy costs and disadvantages. The ambiguity that makes regulation by broad
principles attractive to States reluctant to cede sovereignty to the international legal system also greatly limits these principles’ effectiveness at humanizing war. As demonstrated above, what amounts to unnecessary suffering is still highly uncertain and determined in most cases by States’ individual and subjective evaluations. Similarly, whether means of war amount
to treachery or constitute acceptable ruses remains highly indeterminate.
Accordingly, the predictive value of law of war principles as restraints on
weapons is greatly limited. In light of their inherent ambiguity, as well as
significant variance in State practice, it is exceptionally difficult, in all but
the most obvious cases, to forecast State consensus as to whether a weapon violates any of these principles.
III.

SPECIFIC REGULATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS

Since ancient times, States and other organizations have attempted to develop specific rules applicable to particular weapons alongside general principles. The same considerations that informed the law of war principles
prohibiting unnecessary suffering, indiscriminate weapons and dishonor
often motivated efforts to regulate or to ban specific weapons outright.
Political, economic and other factors also appear to have influenced attempts at weapons bans and regulations and must be considered in any
comprehensive understanding of law of war weapons regulations. Despite
the many considerations that have gone into weapons law development,
understanding the prospects for regulation of weapons benefits profoundly
from an examination of the history of efforts to regulate specific weapons.
While States’ general approaches to, and relationships with, international
law have surely been influential, the qualities and properties of various
weapons themselves seem to have played a significant part in the development of weapons law.
Early efforts to develop specific weapons rules were not especially successful. By 1863, Dr. Francis Lieber, author of the first major law of war
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codification, observed in the code he submitted for adoption by Union
forces in the American Civil War, “no conventional restriction of the
modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted.”75 However, by
the mid-twentieth century, and especially by the late-twentieth century, the
prospects for success at regulating weapons through international bans
proved brighter. Overall, historical results have been greatly varied, but
nonetheless offer useful lessons for future efforts.
A. Poison
Some of the earliest law of war regulations on specific weapons addressed
poisons.76 Ancient Greeks widely forbade the use of poisoned weapons
through custom.77 Because of poison’s secretive nature, ancient Indian society codified a comprehensive poison ban.78 Romans reportedly regarded
use of poison, especially for assassinations, as a form of prohibited treachery and specifically banned its use.79 By medieval times, military custom and
usage included a poison prohibition.80 Academic treatises, so important to
the recognition of the custom and usages of the law of war in the period
between the Middle Ages and the modern era, also widely acknowledged a
ban on poison.81 By the age of positivism, the poison ban featured consistently and unequivocally in States’ early efforts to codify the law of war in
treaties.82
75. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field art. 30, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 3 [hereinafter 1863 Lieber Code].
76. See 3 ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, A HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR: THE CUSTOMS
AND LAWS OF WAR WITH REGARDS TO ARMS CONTROL 87 (2011); DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 53 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2001).
77. 2 COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME 209, 221 (1911).
78. THE LAWS OF MANU 28 (Lecture VII, 90) (John Murdoch ed., trans., The Christian Literature Society 1907) (c. 100 B.C.).
79. PHILLIPSON, supra note 77, at 231.
80. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 142 (2d
ed. 2000).
81 See, e.g., 3 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRES ch. 4, §§15–16 (1625),
reprinted in 2 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 651–53 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
82. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, art. 23(a); Regulations Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(a), annexed to Convention No. II with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247
[hereinafter 1899 Hague Regulations]; 1874 Brussels Declaration, supra note 13, art. 13(a);
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The origins of humanity’s persistent resolve to outlaw the use of poison in warfare are largely instinctive but worthy of study. First, it has been
observed that poisons by their nature do not belong. They have been aptly
defined as “foreign and dangerous substance[s] placed where they should not
be, whether in the human body or the environment. They contravene the
natural order.” 83 This feature of poisons surely explains much of the human and legal revulsion to their use.
A second, instinctive explanation for the poison taboo is that poisons
often thwart expectations—there is a sense that a betrayal accompanies the
harm resulting from their use. Poisons most often take their victims unaware and poisoners often evade detection and accountability. Although war
is understood to involve death and suffering, poisons upset the equilibrium
of lethal expectations to which combatants ordinarily resign themselves by
entering combat.
Some scholars identify in humans a strong genetic predisposition
against poison use. Primates’ innate fear of snakes and arachnids has been
identified in primitive human societies. Strategies of poison avoidance, including general contempt for poisons, likely proved essential attributes of
surviving lines of primate species.84 Humans have historically associated
poison use with insects, snakes, and other pests and species of human disdain.85 Yet even these “lower species” reserve use of poison to predation
and encounters with other species. Examples of conspecific poison use in
nature are reportedly rare.86 Likewise, although some primitive human societies used poison in warfare, the consensus is that such use was exceedingly
uncommon. Even tribes skilled at poison use in hunting appear to have
usually refrained from its use against human adversaries.87
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND art. 8(a) (1880) reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 29 [hereinafter OXFORD MANUAL]; 1863 Lieber Code, supra note 75, art. 16.
83. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, The Development of the Norm against the Use of Poison:
What Literature Tells Us, 27 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 55, 56 (2008) (emphasis
added).
84. Leonard A. Cole, The Poison Weapons Taboo: Biology, Culture, and Policy, 17 POLITICS
AND THE LIFE SCIENCES 119, 120 (1998).
85. Id. at 122.
86. Id. (citing NAPOLEON A. CHAGNON, YANOMAMO: THE LAST DAYS OF EDEN
211–14 (1992)); Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, The Fighting Behavior of Animals, 205 SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN 112 (1961).
87. Cole, supra note 84, at 123–24 (citing LORNA J. MARSHALL, THE !KUNG OF NYAE
NYAE 182, 288 (1976)); GEORGE P. MURDOCK, OUR PRIMITIVE CONTEMPORARIES 176
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Human notions linking poison with mysticism and medicine have also
been cited to explain the taboo.88 Many poisons and their effects evaded
human understanding for centuries. Poisons act subtly and slowly in comparison to kinetic weapons. Moreover, the line between poison and remedy
has proved fine and difficult to identify. Distinguishing substances that enhanced survival from those that threatened it was an enormously important
human undertaking in primitive societies.89 Toxic weapons strained finely
wrought boundaries between medicine and poison to “offend [a] deeprooted sensibility” essential to human health.90 For many primitive societies, only dangerous and unfamiliar mysticism could provide an explanation
of poisons’ effects.
Further cause for the poison ban surely relates to its inhumane effects.
Historical accounts of battlefield deaths by poison relate extreme suffering.
A history of Alexander the Great’s campaign in India describes the deaths
of invaders wounded by the swords of defenders of the city of Harmatelia.
On the king’s side, however, not a few received wounds which all but
proved fatal, since the barbarians had anointed their steels with a deadly
tincture . . . . Accordingly when any one was wounded, his body at once
became numb, and sharp pains soon succeeded, while the whole frame
was shaken with tremblings and convulsions. The skin became cold and
livid, and the stomach discharged bile. A foam, moreover, of a black colour issued from the wound and putrefied. At this stage the poison quickly
spread to the vital parts of the body and caused a death of fearful agony.
Those, therefore, who had been severely wounded and those who had received nothing more than an accidental scratch suffered equally.91

Many historical prohibitions of poison appear primarily concerned with
assassination rather than large-scale tactical or operational use.92 Objections
(1934); Rafael Karsten, Blood Revenge and War among the Jibaro Indians of Eastern Ecuador, in
LAW AND WARFARE 307–8 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1967).
88. Cole, supra note 84, at 124.
89. Id. at 125.
90. Id. (quoting MICHAEL MANDLEBAUM, THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BEFORE AND AFTER HIROSHIMA 38 (1981)).
91. THE INVASION OF INDIA BY ALEXANDER THE GREAT 294–95 (John W. McCrindle ed., 1896).
92. John Doull & M.C. Bruce, Origin and Scope of Toxicology, in TOXICOLOGY: THE
BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 6 (Curtis D. Klaassen, Mary O. Amdur & John Doull eds., 3d
ed. 1986) (recounting that use of poison for political assassination was common in ancient
Greece and during the Middle Ages).
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to poison often relate, as will be shown with respect to other weapons, to
its potential to enable a weak or under-empowered adversary to upset an
established order favoring the strong.93 Poison has shown great potential to
convert matches of strength and resources into contests of betrayal and
exploitation. The disruptive effect of poison is confirmed by its frequent
use as a literary tool capable of arousing tragic pity and venal hatred.94
Despite nearly universally professed distaste for its use and subjection
to legal proscription, poison has seen intermittent use in warfare.95 Professor Gillespie catalogs uses of poisons by ancient and pre-modern armies
spanning centuries and cultures, including Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans,
Indians, Saracens, English, Spanish and French.96 Means of delivery have
included edged weapons, projectiles, wine, water, fumes and, most distressingly but perhaps implausibly, vishakanyas or “poisonous damsels”—
“female courtesans who from early childhood were given doses of poisonous herbs or the venom of snakes and scorpions. By the time they reached
adolescence, although they themselves had become immunised, they were
deadly poisonous to those who had contact with them, especially intimate
contact.”97
Breaches and myths notwithstanding, it is perhaps not surprising that
poison has attracted a consistent and pervasive record of legal condemnation. Unequivocal poison prohibitions featured prominently in nearly all
the major law of war works preceding the Hague Peace Conferences, as

93. Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INTERNATIONAL OR73, 81 (1995).
94. See van Courtland Moon, supra note 83, at 57 (recounting Claudius’s poisoning of
Hamlet’s father in Shakespeare’s Hamlet).
95. See generally ADRIENNE MAYOR, GREEK FIRE, POISON ARROWS & SCORPION
BOMBS: BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (2003); ALFRED A. ROBERTS, THE POISON WAR 52–57 (1915).
96. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 88 (citing TERRY CROWDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN: A
HISTORY OF SPIES, SPYMASTERS AND ESPIONAGE 31 (2006) without quotations). Professor Maskeill and Stanford Research Scholar Mayor investigate accounts of poisoned robes
or khiat in ancient India and other cultures. See Michelle Maskiell & Adrienne Mayor, Killer
Khilats, Part 1: Legends of Poisoned “Robes of Honor” in India, 112 FOLKLORE 23 (2001);
Michelle Maskiell & Adrienne Mayor, Killer Khilats, Part 2: Imperial Collecting of Poison Dress
Legends in India, 112 FOLKLORE 163 (2001) [hereinafter Maskiell & Mayor, Part 2].
97. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 88. Maskiell and Mayor include a reference, but little
more, to “poisonous individuals” and “poison damsels sent to infect Alexander the
Great,” lending some support to Gillespie’s account. Maskiell & Mayor, Part 2, supra note
96, at 165.
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well as the regulations of land warfare those conferences produced.98 Eliciting objections on the basis of suffering, indiscriminateness, treachery, social disruption, resistance to medical treatment, and perhaps even human
genetic predisposition and human evolutionary adaptation, few weapons
seem to have combined so many sources of opposition as poison.
B. Crossbow
One of the most familiar historical weapons bans relates to the crossbow.
The crossbow emerged in the third century B.C. and proliferated in armies,
primarily for use by relatively untrained and lower classes of armed forces.99
Later models, especially those using a steel rather than wooden bow, greatly
improved the ease of use and penetrating power of the traditional bow.100
By the eleventh century, a crossbow bolt could reliably pierce the armor of
the best-equipped knight.101 By the late twelfth century and until the fourteenth century the crossbow was “the dominant handheld missile weapon
in most of western Europe.”102
It is widely reported that in 1139 Pope Innocent II at the Second Lateran Council first attempted to ban the use of the crossbow in war.103 Ac98. See 1863 Lieber Code, supra note 75, art. 16; 1874 Brussels Declaration, supra note
13, art. 12; OXFORD MANUAL, supra note 82, art. 8(a); 1899 Hague Regulations, supra note
82, art. 23(a).
99. STEPHEN SELBY, CHINESE ARCHERY 154 (2000).
100. RALPH PAYNE-GALLWEY, THE BOOK OF THE CROSSBOW 31–37 (Toronto:
General Publishing Company, 1995) (1903). The comparative merits of the crossbow and
longbow have been debated for centuries. The English preference for the longbow manifested itself in domestic law which for centuries prohibited crossbow ownership so as not
to degrade from the yeomanry’s skill with the longbow. Id. at 34 (citing Parliamentary Acts
of 1508, 1512, 1515, 1537 and 1542).
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id. at 4; David S. Bachrach, Crossbows for the King: The Crossbow during the Reigns of
John and Henry II of England, 45 TECHNOLOGY & CULTURE 102, 102 (2004).
103. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
9 (2009); Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff trace a Papal ban on the crossbow and arbalest to a Lateran Council of 1132 rather than 1139. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 76, at 53.
Canon 29 of the Second Lateran Council states, “We forbid under penalty of anathema that that deadly and God-detested art of slingers and archers be in the future exercised
against Christians and Catholics.” A commentary on the Second Lateran Council Canon
appears to challenge the standard account of the Council’s treatment of the crossbow. The
commentary surmises that Canon 29 actually referred to a practice of wagering on archery
at tournaments, a practice previously addressed by the Lateran Synod of 1097. MEDIEVAL
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counts indicate the Council concurred that the crossbow was “deadly and
odious to God.”104 Bows and other projectile weapons had been discredited
far earlier than the Middle Ages. Greek and other ancient societies often
scorned the bow and javelin as inconsistent with honorable warfare and
agreed to prohibit their use in some conflicts.105 Later, German Emperor
Conrad III reportedly banned the crossbow’s use and made its use punishable by death.106
But the crossbow posed much more than a mere tactical threat. Leveling the battlefield between elite, mounted warriors of the nobility and largely untrained, amateur conscripts, the crossbow was feared to have revolutionary effects on established political, military and social orders. Historians
note the crossbow’s important contributions to shifting meta-trends in
warfare. It is thought that a crossbow killed the English king Richard the
Lionheart, but its disruptive effects date to even earlier times.107 The first
episodes of true warfare are thought to have involved periodic invasions by
mounted nomads against sedentary agrarians.108 For centuries tactical advantage rested decisively with the mounted raider. The crossbow later afforded agrarian peoples a means of defense at once effective and easily
employed, shifting military hegemony away from mounted, professional
warrior classes of nomadic peoples such as the Mongols, in favor of stable

SOURCEBOOK: TENTH ECUMENICAL COUNCIL: LATERAN II 1139, available at
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/lateran2.asp (last visited July 29, 2015). The author has inadequate background to judge the accuracy of either the standard view or this
competing interpretation.
104. Miguel A. Marin Luna, Evolution, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 647, 655 (1957).
105. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 8. See also VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, WARS OF THE
ANCIENT GREEKS 38–29 (1999) (describing disdain for archers as “cowards who avoid
face-to-face fighting”).
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id. (citing CHRISTINE DE PISSAN, THE BOOK OF FAYTTES OF ARMES AND OF
CHYVALRYE 217 (A. T. P. Byles ed., William Caxton trans., Oxford University Press,
1932) (1409)); PAYNE-GALLWEY, supra note 100, at 4. Van Creveld also credits development of fortifications and fortresses with the demise of nomadic warriors and the rise of
sedentary civilizations. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR: FROM 2000
B.C. TO THE PRESENT 23 (1989).
108. ROBERT L. O’CONNELL, OF ARMS AND MEN: A HISTORY OF WAR, WEAPONS,
AND AGGRESSION 7 (1989).
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and sedentary populations like the Chinese, Byzantine and European civilizations.109
As a testament to its effectiveness and the weakness of extant weapons
law, orders to develop new crossbow technology and widespread deployment of crossbows post-date most efforts to eliminate use of the weapon.
By the fourteenth century, the crossbow’s place in the arsenals of Europe
was cemented.110 Castle owners required tenants and soldiers to own crossbows.111 Some cities mandated crossbow ownership as a requirement of
citizenship. Even the nobility seems to have warmed to them, reportedly
making frequent diplomatic gifts of crossbows.112
Therefore, despite moral, religious and even strong political objections,
efforts to ban lawful use of the crossbow largely represent a legislative failure.113 Its enormous effectiveness and widespread deployment secured its
place despite mild and selective notoriety. The crossbow offered little to
justify its prohibition other than its potentially disruptive effect on established military hegemony and order. Ultimately, it seems only technological
advance itself, through the development of gunpowder and firearms could
eliminate the crossbow from the battlefield.
C. Firearms and Bullets
Mindful of the battlefield disruption and threats to long-established combatant hierarchies posed by the crossbow, sovereigns resorted to weapons
law to regulate firearms as well.114 Perhaps no means of warfare has a history of regulation as long, as complicated and as controversial as that of small
arms bullets. Yet efforts to regulate bullets have met with only sporadic
success and, over time, the positions of even initially successful regulations
seem to have become less secure.
Surely motivated to preserve established social order, States sought first
to restrict use of firearms to the nobility.115 The emperor of Japan, eager to
109. David Curtis Wright, Nomadic Power, Sedentary Security, and the Crossbow, 58 ACTA
OREINTALIA ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICAE 15 (2005).
110. Bachrach, supra note 102, at 102.
111. Dirk H. Breiding, The Crossbow of Count Ulrich V of Württemberg, 44 METROPOLITAN MUSEUM JOURNAL 61, 61 (2009).
112. Id.
113. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 61.
114. CHARLES FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 667 (4th ed. 1965).
115. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 14 (noting fifteenth and sixteenth century English
and French laws setting minimum incomes for firearms ownership).
568

	
  
	
  
	
  
Regulation-Tolerant Weapons, Regulation-Resistant Weapons
	
  

Vol. 91

preserve the culture and status of his elite samurai warrior class, imposed
an early government monopoly on firearms to ensure they would all be destroyed.116
Later attempts to regulate firearms evolved to address concerns beyond
sustaining elite hegemonies. By the mid-nineteenth century a growing sense
of humanity and alarm at unnecessary suffering caused by new bullet designs led private organizations and even States to seek international regulations. In 1863, Russian engineers developed a small caliber exploding bullet
designed for use against ammunition wagons.117 By 1867, engineers modified these bullets to explode on impact with soft tissue such as the human
body.118 Although militaries also employed them for benign uses, such as
range finding in mountainous regions,119 use against persons reportedly
prompted Russian Tsar Alexander II to propose a conference to form a
treaty renouncing the use of lightweight, exploding projectiles.120 The prevailing thinking at the conference was that bullets designed to explode on
contact with human tissue inflicted suffering greater than that required to
put targeted soldiers out of combat.121
The Tsar’s conference produced in relatively short order the 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration.122 By the Declaration’s terms, the parties agreed
“to renounce, in case of war among themselves, the employment by their
military or naval troops of any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes,
which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances.”123 Through signature and eventual accession, nineteen States
joined the treaty, including many major military powers.124
116. NOEL PERRIN, GIVING UP THE GUN: JAPAN’S REVERSION TO THE SWORD
1543–1879 (1979).
117. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 91.
118. Id.
119. Kalshoven, Arms, supra note 8, at 327 n.14 (citing George V. Fosbery, Explosive
Bullets and Their Application to Military Purposes, 12 ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE
JOURNAL 15 (1869)).
120. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 53; THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 91.
121. Tom Ruys, The XM25 Individual Airburst Weapon System: A “Game Changer” for the
(Law on the) Battlefield? Revisiting the Legality of Explosive Projectiles under the Law of Armed Conflict, 45 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 401, 406 (2012).
122. 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 10.
123. Id.
124. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 56. Roberts and Guelff
indicate the Declaration did not require instruments of ratification, leaving States’ signatures as sufficient for entry into force. Id. at 56 n.2.
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Three decades after the 1868 Declaration and again at the invitation of
a Russian Tsar, this time Nicholas II, States met to consider further law of
war limitations on bullets. At the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, in addition to a convention and regulations on the general law of land warfare,
States produced a declaration prohibiting use of bullets that flatten easily in
the human body.125 Manufactured with an exposed tip or with incisions on
the outer hard jacket to permit a soft lead core to expand on impact, socalled dum-dum bullets were designed to increase stopping power and
produced greatly aggravated wounds.126 Persuaded by arguments that bullet
expansion needlessly intensified suffering, the majority of States present at
the Hague expressed early support during the conference for a ban on expanding bullets.
The United Kingdom, paired with the United States, led efforts to
preempt the Hague prohibition. The Anglo powers, the UK in particular,
argued that expanding bullets were essential to counter fanatical native resistance in colonial possessions.127 Anglo-American representatives also
contested the scientific and practical bases for the prohibition, insisting
States would simply adopt larger calibers to compensate for the loss of
stopping power. The Declaration went forward, however, and provided,
“The contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.”128 Most major military powers
joined the 1899 Declaration with ratifications, accessions and successions
extending to as late as 1978, including the UK in 1907, but never the United States.129
Whether concern for humanity and prevention of superfluous injury
actually motivated all the parties to the St. Petersburg and Hague Declarations is debatable.130 With respect to the 1899 Declaration, humanitarian
125. Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol.
T.S. 459, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 64. [hereinafter 1899 Hague Expanding Bullets Declaration].
126. Alex Ogston, The Peace Conference and the Dum-Dum Bullet, 2 BRITISH MEDICAL
JOURNAL 278 (1899) (providing illustrations of wounds produced by various bullet types);
J. B. Hamilton, The Evolution of the Dum-Dum Bullet, 1 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 1250–51
(1898).
127. Ogston, supra note 126, at 278.
128. 1899 Hague Expanding Bullets Declaration, supra note 125, para. 2.
129. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 65–66.
130. Professor Kalshoven appears to have changed his view concerning Russian motivation for convening the International Military Commission that produced the St. Pe570
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motives are undermined somewhat by the parties’ agreement to ban use
only in armed conflict among themselves.131 Under the Declaration, State
parties were free to use expanding bullets in conflicts with non-State parties
and even in conflicts with one another should a non-State party join either
side as a belligerent.132 This limitation likely explains the UK’s later ratification of the Declaration, given that its objections related chiefly to perceived
requirements of colonial warfare. With respect to the 1868 Declaration,
some speculate Russia feared an arms race involving exploding projectiles
that it could ill afford to win.133 At minimum, the Tsar’s communications to
European powers, bemoaning the costs of funding the then-prevailing state
of armed peace, support the theory.134
Notwithstanding occasional additions of new State parties throughout
the twentieth century, the legacies of the 1899 Expanding Bullets Declaration and the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration are mixed and, in the case of
the latter, quite uncertain. The legal status of the 1899 Declaration is now
somewhat stable though not without reservation. It is widely agreed that
general use of expanding bullets violates customary international law.135

tersburg Declaration. In his 1973 treatise, he observed “no . . . elite or Party interest can
be discerned.” FRITS KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 87–88 (1973). Twelve years
later he admitted to a change of view, observing, “Russian concern at the vulnerability of
its troops for the new bullets . . . had prompted its convening of the Commission.”
Kalshoven, Arms, supra note 8, at 208.
131. See Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 69 (characterizing the 1899 Hague
Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets as “an arms control agreement”).
132. 1899 Hague Expanding Bullets Declaration, supra note 125, paras. 3–4.
133. See James L. Tryon, The Hague Conferences, 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL 470, 471
(1911).
134. Foreign Office, Imperial Russia, The Rescript of the Russian Emperor (Aug. 24,
1898), reprinted in FREDERICK W. HOLLS, THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE AND
ITS BEARINGS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 8–10 (1900).
135. See ICC Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8.2(b)(xix) & (e)(xv). The Court’s elements of crimes clarify that the Statute only makes criminal instances where the perpetrator was aware the expanding bullet would “uselessly aggravate suffering or the wounding
effect.” Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Kampala, Uganda, May 31–June 11, 2010, ICC Doc. RC 9/11, at 13, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-11-ENG.pdf. The elements
seem to exclude uses of expanding bullets where expansion on impact is calculated to reduce aggregate suffering or to minimize overall harm. Id. However, the study of the customary law of war produced by the ICRC asserts an unqualified prohibition on use of
expanding bullets. ICRC CIL STUDY, supra note 11, r. 77, at 268.
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States’ adherence to the prohibition seems to have been relatively strong.136
Even the United States, a non-party to the Declaration, has indicated it
would apply its terms to international armed conflicts.137 Exceptions to the
prohibition likely exist for circumstances where expanding bullets’ tendency not to over-penetrate an intended target would result in a more humane
outcome, such as in hostage rescue situations, or where use of an open
tipped bullet would enhance long-range accuracy and thereby reduce the
risk of collateral damage.138
The legal status of the 1868 Declaration is considerably less clear. Experts and NGOs offer a wide range of conclusions.139 By the early 1920s
State practice and draft rules for air combat seemed to relax the ban on use
of explosive bullets. Draft rules for air warfare permitted use of explosive
projectiles “by or against aircraft” even for parties to the 1868 Declaration.140 Later, a dispute concerning development of exploding 12.7 millimeter rounds, which clearly fell within the relevant 400 gram weight restriction, also seemed to call the reach of the Declaration into question.141
A number of States developed and widely deployed exploding small arms
projectiles in this period for use against lightly armored vehicles. By design,
these rounds explode upon impact with hard surfaces to augment penetration and also to inflict concussion and fragmentation injuries on vehicle
occupants. States that had fielded these rounds determined their design for
anti-materiel use rather than anti-personnel use exempted them from the
Declaration, as well as from any customary norm.142 As perhaps a further
reflection of recent State opinion with respect to the Declaration’s ban, the
136. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 24 (reporting early use of dum-dum and explosive
bullets to have been “surprisingly controlled”).
137. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law—Sniper Use of Open-Tip Ammunition, THE ARMY LAWYER, Feb. 1991, at 86, 87.
138. See Alfons Vanheusden, W. Hays Parks & William H. Boothby, Use of Expanding
Bullets in Military Operations, 50 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 535, 546
(2011); Joshua Berry, Hollow Point Bullets: How History Has Hijacked Their Use in Combat and
Why It Is Time to Reexamine the 1899 Hague Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets, 206 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 88 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Richard R. Baxter, Conventional Weapons under Legal Prohibitions, 1 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 42, 43 (1977) (concluding the 1868 Declaration “passed into general
international law and thus to be obligatory for all states”).
140. Hague Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy and Air Warfare,
Dec. 11, 1922–Feb. 17, 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13,
at 315.
141. See Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 90–97.
142. Id.
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ICC Statute does not include use of exploding, small caliber munitions in
its list of war crimes subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, whereas expanding
bullets are included.143 Academic commentaries have also raised substantial
questions concerning the continued force and customary status of the 1868
Declaration.144
The ICRC concluded recently, however, that anti-personnel use of exploding bullets constitutes a customary international law of war violation.145
In a brief and selective response to the ICRC study, the United States vehemently rejected the conclusion that customary international law prohibited all anti-personnel use of explosive rounds.146 The U.S. view appears only
to prohibit projectiles designed specifically (and perhaps exclusively) to explode in the human body.147 At present, it may be safest to conclude that
only rounds specifically designed or employed to explode on contact with
human tissue are covered by customary international law equivalent to the
1868 Declaration.148 State parties to the Declaration are possibly subject to
the stricter rule in combat between themselves, banning explosive projectiles simply by reference to weight rather than intended target, although
there is evidence that State practice may have carved out an exception for
anti-materiel uses.149
In somewhat recent chapters of the international effort to regulate
small arms projectiles, the United Nations sponsored meetings preparatory
to a Second Review Conference to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 1997 1999, and 2001.150 These efforts attempted to
address small caliber bullets more directly through the Convention’s Article
8 review conference procedures. Initial meetings intended to lead to an Article 8 conference proposed deliberate and scientific examination of bullet
143. See ICC Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8.
144. JOENNIEMI & ROSAS, supra note 36, at 30; Baxter, supra note 139, at 43 (limiting
the customary obligation of the Declaration to anti-personnel use of exploding bullets).
145. ICRC CIL STUDY, supra note 11, r. 78, at 272.
146. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007).
147. Id.
148. Kalshoven, Arms, supra note 8, at 223 (observing “[p]robably, the only remnant
of the one-time sweeping ban [on explosive bullets] is a prohibition to use such projectiles
against human beings”).
149. See UK MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.10–6.10.2; Ruys, supra note 121, at 409–10
(citing MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UNITED KINGDOM, D/DAT/13/35/66, THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT (1981)).
150. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 88.
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wounds, including establishing an international wound ballistics testing facility. State representatives at these meetings, however, rejected the proposal, as well as inclusion of a small caliber bullet provision on the Second
Review Conference agenda.151
In sum, experience with regulating small arms projectiles has met a fate
largely similar to that of earlier efforts with respect to the crossbow. Initial
desire to regulate small arms to prevent disruption to existing political and
military hegemonies did not prove an adequate basis to support law of war
regulation. Nor could initial notoriety muster sufficient inertia to generate
significant international regulation. The effectiveness—and later wide-scale
deployment of firearms and their various projectiles—proved firearms and
their projectiles to be exceptionally regulation resistant. Although colorable
arguments and demonstrable success were made concerning some bullets
with respect to unnecessary suffering and complications associated with
medical treatment, States have increasingly strained against even limits as
deep-rooted and longstanding as the 1868 and 1899 Declarations. Currently, the ban of the former is widely regarded as obsolete, while the latter operates subject to a progressively growing number of contextual exceptions.152
D. Submarines
Although early submarines did not employ novel weapons—surface ships
mounted most of the same guns and torpedoes—their introduction to warfare rapidly attracted international legal attention.153 By the early twentieth
century, after repeated failed efforts to control submarine production, select States resolved to develop limitations on their use. Specifically, a contingent of States led by the United Kingdom sporadically supported by the
United States, proposed rules for the use of submarines against merchant
shipping. Ultimately however, submarines proved exceptionally resistant to
specific regulations and today operate under few, if any, regulations other
than those generally applicable to all weapons.

151. Id. at 89 (relating personal knowledge as the U.S. representative at these meetings).
152. See Berry, supra note 138, at 149–51.
153. W. THOMAS MALLISON, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS 151 (1966) (Vol. 58, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
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Framed and shepherded through debates by U.S. delegate Elihu Root,
early rules on the use of submarines against merchant shipping featured
prominently at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference. Root’s rules, ultimately codified in the conference’s draft submarine treaty, at Article 1 stated,
A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized. A merchant vessel must not be
attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and search after warning or to
proceed as directed after seizure. A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.154

The article then provided, “if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules . . . [it must] desist from attack . . . and
permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.”155
Limiting submarines’ operations had long enjoyed support in the form
of public opinion. Parks relates that the American delegation to the Washington Naval Conference received 400,000 letters and telegrams calling for
restraints on submarines compared to 4,000 supporting free use of submarines.156 Still, the impracticable requirements of the Washington Conference
rules were immediately apparent to States’ representatives. States also identified ambiguity concerning the scope of vessels regarded as merchants as a
source of concern and the draft treaty never entered force.157
Undeterred, submarine antagonists revisited the subject at the 1930
London Naval Conference. Citing interests of humanity, but also motivated by their desire to guard their still-significant surface fleet, the British
hosts argued for a complete ban on submarines.158 While the conference
saw the United States reverse course to favor the ban, other States—
especially Japan—were opposed. As an alternative, the British representa154. Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare art. 1,
Feb. 6, 1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13,
at 1139 [hereinafter Submarines and Gases Treaty].
155. Id.
156. W. Hays Parks, Making Law of War Treaties: Lessons from Submarine Warfare Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF PROFESSOR L.C. GREEN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 339, 348
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2000) (Vol. 75, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) [hereinafter Parks, Lessons].
157. Id. at 351.
158. Id. at 353.
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tives proposed a resurrection of the 1922 submarine treaty draft rules.159
The Conference adopted the rules, but they saw limited ratification and
only mild enthusiasm for implementation, especially in Japan.160 By 1936,
Japan announced its withdrawal from the London Treaty.
Despite Japanese withdrawal, the United States and Britain led a second
London Naval Conference in 1936. The second conference produced a
Procés-Verbal to the 1930 Treaty of London which stated in the relevant
part,
except in the case of a persistent refusal to stop on being summoned, or
of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or
submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a
place of safety.161

Although more widely ratified, the 1936 Procés-Verbal proved ineffective
at regulating submarine warfare during the Second World War. No major
naval power adhered to its provisions.162 Contempt for the Procés-Verbal
even extended to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where
the Tribunal awarded no punishment to German Navy Chief Karl Dönitz,
despite adjudging technical convictions for violations of its rules against
him.163
Parks offers a number of insightful observations concerning the ProcésVerbal. First, he attributes failure of the Procés-Verbal submarine rules to
their adoption in place of failed arms control efforts. Clearly intended to
render submarines obsolete, the rules attempted to achieve through humanitarian regulation what could not be achieved through arms control.
Second, he characterizes its rules as a disingenuous effort to alter strategic
159. Id. at 354 (relating, however, that British Navy officials were by no means unanimous in their support for resurrecting the 1922 rules). See also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 76, at 169 (Roberts and Guelff explaining that French refusal to ratify
prevented the Treaty from entering into force).
160. Parks, Lessons, supra note 156, at 355.
161. Procés-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of
the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S 353, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 1145.
162. Parks, Lessons, supra note 156, at 342. In fact, Parks has concluded that at least
two powers’ deviation from the provisions of the Procés-Verbal was “instant and unhesitating.” Id.
163. 22 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS AT THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 559 (1948).
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and operational balances of power and arms through law of war regulation.164 This second observation, concerning disruption, fits similarly failed
efforts with respect to the crossbow and early firearms regulations. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, Parks notes that international law regulation
of submarines may have been doomed to failure all along because they
were such an effective means of warfare.165 Their wide-scale deployment by
the Second World War, as well as the unprecedented access they offered to
the vulnerabilities of the world’s surface fleet, surely contributed to their
regulation resistance as well.
E. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
In 1968, an international conference on human rights held in Tehran166
sparked not only several years of the most intense law of war development
in modern history, it also ignited a brief turf war concerning sponsorship of
law of war development. Inspired by the Tehran conference, the UN General Assembly invited the Secretary-General to study the “need for additional humanitarian international conventions and rules.”167 In response,
and clearly anxious to preserve its traditional role in law of war development, the ICRC initiated a competing series of meetings of its own. Following the UN and ICRC meetings, and what was for practical purposes a
twenty-five-year hiatus on law of war treaty development, States formally
met in 1974 to consider amendments and additions to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.168 After significant wrangling, States declined to address the
topic of weapons regulation at the ICRC-sponsored diplomatic conferences that produced the 1977 Additional Protocols. But agreement
emerged simultaneously to address weapons separately, under UN auspices.169
164. Parks, Lessons, supra note 156, at 365.
165. Id. at 366.
166. International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, April 22–May 13,
1968, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41
(May 13, 1968) [hereinafter Tehran Conference Final Act].
167. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), ¶ 2(b), U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Dec. 19, 1968).
168. For thorough accounts of the proceedings of the 1974–77 Diplomatic Conference and the resulting Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, see generally BOTHE,
PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 6.
169. See G.A. Res. 32/152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/152 (Dec. 19, 1977); Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974–1977, Resolution 22, Follow-up Regarding
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A series of meetings of government experts attempted to identify
common ground between States concerning the regulation of conventional
weapons and to study technical and medical issues.170 These meetings
proved to be a broad effort to identify opportunities for progress in the
regulation of weapons. Their labors eventually produced the important, but
clumsily named 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).171 The CCW addresses specific weapons States deem
to be inconsistent with the fundamental law of war principles of discrimination and unnecessary suffering.
The CCW envisions an iterative, open-ended procedure for amendment and expansion. In fact, the base CCW actually contains no substantive rules concerning weapons. Instead, Article 8 permits State parties to
convene periodically to consider protocols respecting categories of weapons or to amend existing CCW protocols on specific weapons.172 Simple
majorities are insufficient to add new protocols to the CCW regime—all
State parties to the CCW must join in consensus to add a protocol. While
onerous, the consensus requirement has been an important, if controversial, facet of the CCW process since its formative meetings and conferences.173
Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, June 9, 1977, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 827 (recommending a Conference of Governments convene not later than 1979 to reach agreement on prohibiting or restricting
“weapons . . . which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate
effects”).
170. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE WORK
OF EXPERTS: WEAPONS THAT MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (1973); LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8; 1976 LUGANO REPORT,
supra note 31. For useful summaries of these conferences, see Kalshoven, Arms, supra note
8, at 230–42.
171. 1980 CCW, supra note 59.
172. Id., art. 8.
173. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, at 97 (reproducing rules of the Conference).
Rule 8 provided, “The Conference shall not adopt any resolution or recommendation and
shall not vote. When differing views are expressed on a point and the discussion does not
result in conclusions acceptable to all, note shall be taken of the different opinions expressed.” Id. The requirement of producing consensus, rather than resolutions expressed
by majority vote, was essential to securing agreement of a number of parties, including the
United States, to participate. See Kalshoven, Arms, supra note 8, at 232–33 (noting considerable differences of opinion between States and compromises required to secure agreement to attend the weapons conferences that led to the CCW).
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Although a fifteen-year gap intervened between conclusion of the original CCW conference and its first Article 8 review conference, the CCW
review process has been one of the most active in the history of the law of
war.174 Following the first review conference, held in 1996, the CCW State
parties resolved to hold subsequent review conferences every five years.175
The CCW now includes comprehensive weapons bans on both nondetectable fragments and blinding lasers, as well as two protocols that
greatly restrict use of landmines and incendiaries and a protocol outlining
significant responsibilities with respect to weapons that produce unexploded remnants. Still, the record of success at the CCW remains mixed. To
date the CCW process has debated, but failed to achieve consensus on a
number of other weapons, including small caliber bullets, fuel-air explosives, high-velocity flechettes, cluster munitions and, most recently, lethal
autonomous weapons.176
F. Non-detectable Fragments
The first of the three original CCW protocols addressed to a specific conventional weapon, the Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments states in its
entirety, “It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is
to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by Xrays.”177 The de minimus costs to military advantage and the humanitarian
benefits of banning a weapon have perhaps never been so obvious as with
respect to non-detectable fragments. Non-detectable fragments, such as
glass, greatly frustrate established medical protocols for treatment of trau174. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 104.
175. Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Final Document, Conf. Doc.
CCW/CONF.I/16 (Part I), at 38 (1996).
176. Efforts to regulate lethal autonomous weapons through the CCW process is only
in early stages. The United States has reacted especially cautiously to such efforts. See Michael W. Meier, U.S Department of State, U.S. Opening Statement at the CCW Informal
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Apr. 13, 2015,
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/04/15/u-s-opening-statement-at-the-ccw-informalmeeting-of-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/. Regarding cluster munitions
and the negotiation of a convention regulating their use outside the CCW review process,
see infra text supported by note 246.
177. Protocol [I to the Convention on Prohibitions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168.
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ma wounds, requiring invasive exploratory surgery to locate and treat. In
this respect, non-detectable fragments continue to inflict additional wounds
and suffering even after the victim has been rendered hors de combat, evacuated from the battlefield and begun medical treatment. Few weapons seem
so clearly to inflict unnecessary suffering as non-detectable fragments, although CCW Protocol I does not explicitly memorialize a conclusion to this
effect.
Accounts of the CCW process do not record significant disagreement
or difficulties achieving consensus with respect to the non-detectable fragments ban. The Protocol has 115 State parties, many of whom are militarily
significant, and appears to enjoy a relatively successful record of implementation and observance.178 Non-detectable fragments are not known to have
ever been widely deployed, nor do they offer unique or novel military advantage.
G. Landmines
The CCW process also presented States an opportunity to address the humanitarian plague of landmines.179 In addition to their unintended effects
on civilians, landmines initially offended senses of military honor by their
reliance on surprise, deception and, most characteristically, victim activation rather than direct confrontation.180 It is well known that mines have
produced tragic and widespread casualties among civilian populations, especially during and after conflicts involving their indiscriminate use. Mines
have also produced particularly gruesome wounds, requiring amputations
of lower limbs and inflicting heinous wounds to the genital and abdomen

178. States Parties and Signatories, UNOG, http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.
nsf/(httpPages)/3ce7cfc0aa4a7548c12571c00039cb0c?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=
1#_Section1 (last visited July 29, 2015).
179. Unmarked minefields present significant obstacles to societies recovering from
the effects of armed conflict. See GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 60 n.218–40 (showcasing
over forty Security Council resolutions noting negative effects of landmines in war-torn
countries).
180. See STUART MASLEN, ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES UNDER HUMANITARIAN LAW: A
VIEW FROM THE VANISHING POINT 5 (2001) (citing MILTON F. PERRY, INFERNAL MACHINES: THE STORY OF CONFEDERATE SUBMARINE AND MINE WARFARE 22 (1985));
Baxter, supra note 139, at 44, 48 (noting a treacherous conception of mines, however,
more so with respect to civilians than against military personnel).
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areas. Furthermore, mine wounds are known to exact a high mortality rate
and when not fatal often result in permanent disability.181
The first militarily significant use of anti-personnel landmines as the
term is understood today dates to the American Civil War. The Confederate Army is reported to have altered artillery shells to explode by being
stepped on.182 Estimates indicate that both sides deployed fewer than
20,000 mines. Yet, one hundred years after the conflict, Civil War-era
mines were discovered in a live condition in the American South.183 Mine
warfare proliferated greatly during the Second World War, with deployments numbering in the hundreds of millions.184 The Korean and Vietnam
conflicts also involved significant use of mines, with the United States making use of remotely-delivered mines scattered by aircraft or projectiles in
the latter conflict.185 Accurate estimates of the number of uncleared
landmines have proved somewhat elusive. Studies motivated by political
and financial goals have been proved to include drastic overestimations.186
Yet reports of casualties from mines are irrefutably grave, with reliable annual estimates running to more than ten thousand.187
Interestingly, responsible military doctrine considers landmines primarily as a means of countermobility operations, as opposed to casualty generators. In tactical and operational terms, mines are most effective when deployed to prevent or slow enemy maneuver rather than to directly generate
casualties or achieve general attrition, although they have frequently been
used simply to harass enemy activity, especially by irregular forces.188 For
181. JOENNIEMI & ROSAS, supra note 36, at 60.
182. MASLEN, supra note 180, at 4–5 (citing MIKE CROLL, THE HISTORY OF
LANDMINES 16–17 (1998)).
183. Id. at 5.
184. Id. at 6 (citing UNITED STATES DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY & UNITED
STATES ARMY FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER, LANDMINE WARFARE—
TRENDS AND PREDICTIONS 2-1 (1992).
185. MASLEN, supra note 180, at 8.
186. See id. at 19–22 (providing critiques of various overestimations of uncleared
mines).
187. Id. See also Landmine Monitor, LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, available at http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/LandmineMonitor (last visited Aug. 8, 2015) (posting annual reports on landmine situations, including individual country profiles).
188. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 5-102, COUNTERMOBILITY
80, 84 (1985) [hereinafter FM 5-102] (noting “mines are the most effective means of reinforcing the terrain to stop, slow, or channelize the enemy into areas where he can be
killed”).
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instance, landmines (anti-vehicle mines in particular) can be used to channelize enemy forces into direct fire engagement areas or to slow their progress through such zones, providing greater opportunities for defenders to
fire on targets.189 Refined military doctrine instructs forces to watch over
mines to inflict direct-fire casualties or by calling for indirect fire, such as
artillery or mortars, against enemy forces blocked or slowed by attempts to
breach the minefield.190 Additionally, by slowing enemy advance and increasing advancing forces’ exposure time in engagement areas, landmines
can greatly reduce the number of defenders required to hold a broad front.
Initial thoughts concerning regulation considered development of international marking requirements for minefields. Obligations to post signs
or symbols and a duty to hand over maps indicating locations of mines
were considered at various times in the history of efforts to regulate
them.191 Although the original CCW diplomatic conference considered the
possibility of a ban on anti-personnel landmines, States were unable to
achieve any sort of consensus on this point. 192 Other regulatory efforts
sought to limit means of landmine dispersal. A 1974 proposal considered
banning air delivery of mines to reduce indiscriminate effects, and discussions included rocket or missile delivery as well.193
Rather than ban anti-personnel landmines, the CCW process produced
two instruments regulating their use. The first was Protocol II on the Use
of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices.194 According to reports, draft189. Studies that acknowledge the military value of anti-vehicle mines have questioned the tactical value of anti-personnel mines, noting costs in terms of casualties, loss of
flexibility and loss of support of indigenous populations. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES: FRIEND OR FOE: A STUDY OF THE
MILITARY USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES 71–72 (1996) [hereinafter ICRC, FRIEND OR FOE].
190. FM 5-102, supra note 188, at 84.
191. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT RULES FOR THE
LIMITATION OF THE DANGERS INCURRED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF
WAR art. 15 (2d ed. 1958) [hereinafter ICRC 1956 DRAFT RULES]. See also JOENNIEMI &
ROSAS, supra note 36, at 57 (noting, however, that by 1975 no precise proposals for international marking requirements existed).
192. Burris M. Carnahan, The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 73, 74 (1984) (describing it as agreement to devise limitations rather than a prohibition on mines).
193. JOENNIEMI & ROSAS, supra note 36, at 58 (citing 1974 unidentified working paper).
194. Protocol [II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
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ing of CCW Protocol II proved non-contentious.195 Rather than resort to
purely humanitarian innovations, the Protocol’s requirements derived largely from emerging military doctrine requiring marking and recording of
minefields.196 The majority of the Protocol’s substantive provisions address
indiscriminate deployment of mines and it includes a number of prohibitions and precautions intended to spare civilians from the effects of mine
operations.197 For example, the Protocol greatly limits placement of mines
in or near areas populated by civilians.198 It also requires that the locations
of remotely delivered mines be recorded and that they include neutralizing
devices to render them harmless or destroy them when they no longer
serve a military purpose.199
The Protocol also regulates booby traps, which include “an apparently
harmless portable object which is specifically designed and constructed to
contain explosive material and to detonate when it is disturbed or approached.”200 As a supplement to existing rules on perfidy and treachery,
the Protocol forbids placement of booby traps among protected symbols
and facilities such as medical installations, or associating booby traps with
items routinely required by the civilian population such as food, children’s
items and religious objects.201 Finally, States included elaborate recording
requirements for minefields and booby traps and a duty to remove minefields “after the cessation of active hostilities.”202
Preparatory meetings to generate updates and amendments to CCW
Protocol II began in Geneva in 1994, with a formal CCW Article 8 Review
Conference held in Vienna in 1995 and another in 1996. These ultimately
produced Amended CCW Protocol II, which expanded CCW application
to non-international armed conflicts, addressed remotely-delivered mines in
greater detail, provided for detectability standards, and added provisions

Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter CCW Protocol
II].
195. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 77.
196. Id.
197. CCW Protocol II, supra note 194, arts. 2–3.
198. Id., art 4.
199. Id., art. 5.
200. Id., art. 6(a).
201. Id., art. 6.
202. Id., arts. 7–9.
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addressing anti-handling devices affixed to mines and self-deactivation requirements.203
Despite their success in generating amendments, the 1995 and 1996
Review Conferences competed for attention and adherents with a simultaneous effort to ban landmines altogether led by the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, a network of NGOs formed in 1992.204 The effort,
supported also by the ICRC and a number of States, drew heavily on perceptions of public conscience against landmines, especially against their
effects on civilian populations. In 1996, the Canadian government hosted a
conference in Ottawa beginning a process to ban anti-personnel mines
through a treaty. The effort culminated at an Oslo meeting where States
produced the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,205
which was later signed by 122 States in Ottawa in December 1997. The
Convention now has 162 State parties.206 A number of militarily significant
States, however, have not ratified or acceded to the Convention, including
China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and the
United States.
The Ottawa Convention represents one of the most thorough weapons
regulations ever devised by States. Parties to the Convention have agreed
not only to refrain from using landmines, but also never to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or
indirectly, anti-personnel mines.”207 The Convention also addresses parties’
interactions with other States’ military operations by forbidding parties to

203. Protocol [II amended to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133.
204. Timeline of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN
TO BAN LANDMINES, http://www.icbl.org/media/916929/icb009_chronology_a5_v4pages.pdf (last visited July 29, 2015).
205. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211
[hereinafter 1997 Ottawa Convention].
206. Chapter XXVI Disarmament, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and their Destruction, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no
=XXVI-5&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited July 29, 2015).
207. 1997 Ottawa Convention, supra note 205, art 1.
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“assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under [the] Convention.”208
Efforts to regulate and to prohibit anti-personnel mines have been
complicated, implicating nearly the full range of humanitarian and other
considerations that have informed law of war regulation of weapons. Existing landmine provisions appear to manifest consideration of all three principles of the law of war, as well as taking into account considerable negative public opinion, stigma and notoriety. While certainly symbolic advances for the effort to expand law of war treatment of specific weapons, on
deeper reflection, the CCW Protocols on mines (in contrast to the Ottawa
Convention) seem to add very little that scrupulous adherence to the general law of war principle of discrimination would not already have achieved.
Despite seemingly legitimate claims concerning their military effectiveness
and wide deployment, States committed to preserving the lawfulness of
anti-personnel landmines seem increasingly tolerant of limits on their resort
to them, if only as a matter of policy.209
H. Incendiary Weapons
The military value and effectiveness of incendiaries has been deeply debated. They have been used with great effect on entrenched troops, especially
against determined defenders in bunkers, caves and other fortifications.
Flamethrowers and other projecting incendiary weapons can reach around
confined corners and through obstacles or openings in ways that few other
weapons can.
The chief characteristic of incendiaries, however, may be their psychological effect.210 Burn wounds produce severe pain and require intensive
medical care to treat. Death from burns may occur long after wound infliction. Some types of incendiaries, such as napalm, produce more serious
burns than others. In addition to burns, other incendiaries, such as white
208. Id.
209. In 2014, the United States announced at the Third Review Conference of the
Ottawa Convention, that it would no longer produce or acquire anti-personnel landmines.
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Changes to
U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy (June 27, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/06/27/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy; Jim Garamone, U.S. Announces Changes to Landmine Policy, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (June
27, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122562.
210. JOENNIEMI & ROSAS, supra note 36, at 46.
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phosphorous, introduce toxins and consume sufficient oxygen in confined
spaces to result in asphyxiation.211
Given their grave capacity to injure, it is not surprising that weapons
law history is replete with efforts to regulate incendiary weapons. At the
1932—34 League of Nations Disarmament Conference, the United Kingdom proposed a draft convention to forbid the use, production and stockpiling of incendiary weapons, including flamethrowers.212 The proposal reportedly attracted universal support among the States represented, however, the ban never entered force after the general failure of the Conference.
The widespread destruction and human suffering caused by use of incendiary bombs during the Second World War and especially the use of
napalm in later conflicts ultimately inspired renewed attention. A 1956
ICRC proposal even classified incendiaries alongside nuclear, chemical and
bacteriological agents as weapons whose effects could not be controlled
sufficiently to protect civilian populations.213 Attention to incendiaries became quite intense by the early 1970s with a significant number of States
advocating a ban on their use, especially in anti-personnel engagements.214
States finally addressed the use of incendiaries in Protocol III to the
1980 CCW. As with anti-personnel landmines, some States and organizations sought to ban the use of incendiaries, yet Protocol III merely restricts
their use. Article 2(2) provides, “It is prohibited in all circumstances to
make any military objective within a concentration of civilians the object of
attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.”215 Article 2(3) addresses use of
211. Id. at 46.
212. Id. at 5, 46.
213. ICRC 1956 DRAFT RULES, supra note 191, art. 14.
214. Parks, Weapons Reviews, supra note 9, at 78. See also G.A. Res. 3255A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3255 (XXIX) (Dec. 9, 1974); G.A. Res. 3255B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3255 (XXIX)
(Dec. 9, 1974); G.A. Res. 3076 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3076 (XXVIII) (Dec. 6,
1973); G.A. Res. 2932A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2932 (XXVII) (Nov. 29, 1972) (recording the
General Assembly “deplores the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all armed
conflicts”); G.A. Res. 2852, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2852 (XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971); U.N. Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, ¶ 126, U.N. Doc. A/8052 (Sept.
18, 1970) (asking the General Assembly to consider requesting the Secretary-General to
prepare a report on napalm); U.N. Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts, ¶ 200, U.N. Doc. A/7720 (Nov. 20, 1969) (suggesting a legal study on napalm be
undertaken); Tehran Conference Final Act, supra note 166 (addressing napalm).
215. Protocol [III to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary
Weapons art. 2(2), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171.
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incendiaries delivered by means other than air, prohibiting their use against
military objectives except when they are “clearly separated” from concentrations of civilians and when precautions are taken to protect civilians and
civilian objects from the effects of their use.216
Examination of Protocol III’s substantive limits demonstrates that the
Protocol is best understood as a manifestation and refinement of the principle of discrimination rather than of unnecessary suffering. Civilians, rather than combatants, appear to be the primary beneficiaries of the Protocol. Had it been intended to address unnecessary suffering, one would have
expected provisions limiting or even prohibiting incendiary use against
combatants. That the Protocol includes no such limits leaves the law of war
principle of unnecessary suffering itself the only limit on their use against
combatants, greatly undermining arguments that incendiary use involves
unnecessary suffering per se. While undoubtedly an improvement in general humanitarian terms, the Protocol is evidence of States’ view of the
continued military effectiveness of incendiaries despite strong medical evidence of inflicting high degrees of human suffering and their seemingly
reduced deployment.
I. Blinding Lasers
At the First CCW Review Conference, convened nearly fifteen years after
the base CCW treaty and first three protocols were completed, the CCW
parties added a protocol to ban blinding lasers. Protocol IV prohibits use
and transfer of “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat
function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness
to unenhanced vision . . . .”217 The Blinding Lasers Protocol is a rare instance of States agreeing to ban a weapon in advance of its deployment.218
There are 104 State parties to the Protocol, including a high number of
militarily significant States. Consent to be bound by the Protocol progressed somewhat slowly after its entry into force in 1998. Nearly a third of
the current State parties joined the Protocol more than five years after

216. Id., art. 2(3).
217. Protocol [IV to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Blinding Laser Weapons art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380
U.N.T.S. 370. [hereinafter 1980 CCW Protocol IV]
218. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 517.
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that.219 Militarily significant States not party to Protocol IV include Afghanistan, Algeria, Central African Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran,
Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sudan, Syria,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.220
Like its predecessor concerning non-detectable fragments, the Blinding
Lasers Protocol is by modern standards an exceedingly brief and seemingly
unambiguous law of war instrument.221 Its brevity and clarity mask, however, the somewhat contested nature of its development and adoption. Efforts to regulate or ban blinding lasers actually preceded the CCW review
conferences by more than two decades.222 At the original CCW proceedings, States rejected a ban on blinding lasers proposed by Sweden.223 Resistance to the ban stemmed from disagreement whether blinding by laser
inflicted unnecessary suffering, and fear that a ban on blinding lasers might
impact other laser use on the modern battlefield,224 which includes target
designation, range finding and even destructive functions.225
By the mid-to-late 1980s States and international organizations harbored sufficient concern regarding the blinding effects of lasers to provoke
a series of ICRC and UN conferences to reinvestigate the feasibility of in-

219. Treaties Database, Status of the Protocol, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org
/treaties/t/ccwc_p4 (last visited July 29, 2015).
220. Id.
221. 1980 CCW Protocol IV, supra note 217. The Protocol’s brevity is due in significant part to its reliance on the administrative provisions of its base treaty, the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. See 1980 CCW, supra note 171.
222. W. Hayes Parks, Memorandum of Law: Travaux Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of
Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol, reprinted in THE ARMY LAWYER, June 1997, at 33, 33.
223. Id.
224. Id. See also Ann Peters, Blinding Laser Weapons: New Limits on the Technology of Warfare, 18 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 733,
734 (1995) (reporting that the United States. “strenuously resisted” international regulation
of lasers until 1995).
225. See Julian E. Barnes, Navy Tests Laser Weapon on Drones, Boats, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/navy-tests-laser-weapon-ondrones-boats-1418182202; Ben Farmer, US Navy Testing New Drone Killing Laser Weapon in
Gulf, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/north
america/usa/11253505/US-Navy-testing-new-drone-killing-laser-weapon-in-Gulf.html.
See generally Burrus M. Carhanan, Unnecessary Suffering, the Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 705
(1995) (emphasizing the military potential of anti-optic and dazzling lasers).
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ternational regulation.226 Some studies emphasized the gruesome physical
process by which lasers inflict blindness. Laser damage to eyes can reportedly occur by vaporizing water in eye tissue into steam, by heating tissue to
temperatures sufficient to cook the eye or even by generating plasma that
harnesses sufficient energy to induce an explosion in the eye.227 Not all
considerations leading to the conclusion that blinding lasers caused unnecessary suffering related to physical injury. One account of a blinding by laser is particularly repugnant and relates well the potential for psychological
suffering: “When the beam struck my eye, I heard a distinct popping sound
caused by a laser-induced explosion at the back of my eyeball. My vision
was obscured almost immediately by streams of blood.”228 Studies also emphasized “a devastating and immediate effect on military morale” from
blinding lasers.229 Eyesight is regarded as the most important of human
senses, a finding buttressed by instinctive human reactions to protect the
eyes during traumatic events and crises.230 Still other studies suggested that
long-term and permanent blindness inflict severe, life-long psychological
suffering.231 Similar studies expressed great concern for the social costs of
supporting blinded war veterans.232
Considering the total ban on combat use of blinding lasers, as opposed
to mere limitations on use, it may not be too great a stretch to conclude
that a determination regarding unnecessary suffering motivated many
States’ support for the Protocol. Some might go so far as to conclude
blinding laser use constitutes unnecessary suffering per se.
226. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, BLINDING
WEAPONS: REPORTS OF THE MEETINGS OF EXPERTS CONVENED BY THE ICRC ON BATTLEFIELD LASER WEAPONS 1989–1991 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1993) [hereinafter
ICRC, BLINDING WEAPONS].
227. Bengt Anderberg, Ove E. Bring & Myron L Wolbarsht, Blinding Laser Weapons
and International Humanitarian Law, 29 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 287, 290–91(1992).
228. Jack H. McCall Jr., Blinded by the Light: International Law and the Legality of Anti-Optic
Laser Weapons, 30 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (1997) (quoting a recounting of a researcher’s accidental blinding by a laboratory laser in William Arkin, Ban Tactical
Laser Weapons: DoD Maintains Blinding is Not Violation of War, DEFENSE NEWS, July 17–23,
1995, at 20).
229. McCall, supra note 228, at 291.
230. Id. at 294.
231. R. DeVour, Possible Psychological and Societal Effects of Sudden Permanent Blindness of
Military Personnel Caused by Battlefield Use of Laser Weapons, in ICRC, BLINDING WEAPONS,
supra note 226, at 46, 47.
232. D. Warren, Psychological Effects of Total Permanent Blindness Occurring in Early Adulthood, in ICRC, BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 226, at 50.
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While the record indicates a contentious process of negotiation, it is
possible that on careful consideration States concluded that lasers designed
and employed specifically to blind do not offer sufficient military advantage
to justify the documented suffering and social costs of their effects on humans. In this regard, as a line-of-sight, direct-fire weapon, lasers do not
seem to offer significant military advantage, novel access to enemy vulnerabilities or effectiveness greater than other direct-fire weapons. It is true
that lasers are much less, if at all, susceptible to trajectory effects from
gravity and environmental considerations such as wind, temperature and
humidity. However, unlike incendiaries, their battlefield use did not seem
to offer access to targets that could not be reached effectively by other
means. That medical science offers no cure or treatment to restore the
damage caused by blinding lasers likely contributed to their ultimate regulation tolerance. Success at concluding the Protocol is also likely attributable
to negotiators’ success at devising language to permit use of lasers for other
purposes, such as range finding and target designation.
J. Cluster Munitions
The most surprising aspect of cluster munitions may not be the rapidly increasing pace at which they are regulated nor their remarkable engineering,
but rather their relatively early appearance on the battlefield. Generally
identified as munitions that disperse multiple independent, explosive submunitions, cluster munitions featured in fifteenth century design drawings
of Leonardo da Vinci.233 They were reportedly first used by Sweden in
1840, in the form of mortars that scattered exploding grenades.234 By the
twentieth century, British scientists developed cluster munitions intended
to facilitate incendiary attacks during the First World War.235 Their first
widespread use was by German and Soviet forces in the Second World War
against urban targets and armored forces, respectively.236 Later in the war,
the United States used cluster munitions with incendiary submunitions

233. Virgil Wiebe, John Borrie & Declan Smyth, Introduction to THE CONVENTION ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS: A COMMENTARY 1 (Gro Nystuen & Stuart Casey-Maslen eds.,
2010) (citing MARCO CIANCHI, LEONARDO DA VINCI’S MACHINES 31(1988)).
234. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 65.
235. See ERIC PROKOSCH, THE TECHNOLOGY OF KILLING: A MILITARY AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS 82 (1995).
236. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 65.
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against Japanese cities.237 Since those pioneering uses, it is estimated cluster
munitions have been used in at least thirty-three other armed conflicts.238
Military doctrine recognizes that cluster munitions offer a number of
important advantages in combat. Cluster munitions, especially those that
are air-delivered, minimize risks to friendly forces by reducing the number
of sorties required to apply ordnance to large military objectives.239 A single
cluster munition, through dispersal of multiple submunitions, can cover an
area comparable to that of dozens (or more) conventional, fragmenting
munitions. The dispersed effects of submunitions are also effective against
moving targets. Rather than strike the actual intended target or very near it,
cluster munitions need only strike the general area through which a mobile
target is moving. Cluster munitions have also proved particularly effective
against anti-aircraft arrays, permitting pilots to avoid dangerous, low-level
bombing runs required to accurately employ single-blast unguided
bombs.240
Concern for humanitarian costs of cluster munitions emerged soon after their proliferation. Active efforts to regulate or ban cluster munitions
intensified after the United States used them extensively in the Vietnam
War.241 High dud rates and the propensity of unexploded submunitions to
attract attention from children led to calls to regulate cluster munitions in
the early 1970s.242 Civilian casualty figures resulting from indiscriminate use
237. PROKOSCH, supra note 235, at 82.
238. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 65.
239. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE LAW 296 (2002).
240. PROKOSCH, supra note 235, at 83–84.
241. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 65. Gillespie estimates the United States dropped as
many as 285 million submunitions during the Vietnam War. Id. at 66. Human Rights
Watch reports a significantly greater amount, estimating the United States dropped nearly
400 million submunitions on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
MEETING THE CHALLENGE: PROTECTING CIVILIANS THROUGH THE CONVENTION ON
CLUSTER MUNITIONS 7, 10–11 (Nov. 2010), available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/de
fault/files/reports/armsclusters1110webwcover.pdf. See also Michael Krepon, Weapons
Potentially Inhumane: The Case of Cluster Bombs, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 595, 603–4 (Apr. 1974)
(describing extensive U.S. use of cluster munitions in northern Vietnam).
242. William H. Boothby, Cluster Bombs: Is There a Case for New Law?, 5 HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, OCCASIONAL PAPER 14 (2005) [hereinafter Boothby, Cluster Bombs] (relating data on cluster munition dud rates between 5 and 20–30 percent); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FATALLY
FLAWED: CLUSTER BOMBS AND THEIR USE BY THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN
(2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us-afghanistan/Afghan1202.pdf
[hereinafter FATALLY FLAWED].
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of cluster munitions and the work of NGOs generated significant negative
opinion, similar to the campaign against anti-personnel landmines.243 It is
believed that Israel’s 2006 use of as many as 4.6 million submunitions
against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, resulting in perhaps 265 civilian
deaths between 2006 and 2009 from those that failed to explode, proved a
crucial tipping point in international efforts to ban cluster munitions.244
By 1990, firm proposals to ban cluster munition use or to place strict
regulations on acceptable dud rates circulated among several States.245 A
number of States and NGOs later exercised the CCW Article 8 review process to address humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions.246
At a series of meetings and conferences, including periodic CCW review
conferences, State parties made a number of important determinations with
respect to regulation of cluster munitions.247 First, the CCW States resolved
not to address cluster munitions as such, but rather through Protocol V
regulations on unexploded ordnance in general.248 Second, States rejected a
243. NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1999),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/05/11/natos-use-cluster-munitions-yugoslavia. The
report, in fact, equates unexploded cluster bomb submunitions with anti-personnel
landmines, a conclusion rejected by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Id.; International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 27,
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf (last visited June 29, 2015).
See also Thomas Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51 AIR
FORCE LAW REVIEW 229 (2001) (rebutting arguments equating cluster munitions with
anti-personnel landmines).
244. Wiebe, Borrie & Smyth, supra note 233, at 10–11, 15.
245. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 67. The earliest State proposal to ban cluster munitions may have been a 1974 Swedish proposal to prohibit “cluster warheads” submitted to
the drafting conference that prepared Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. See Wiebe, Borrie & Smyth, supra note 233, at 12 (citing Working Paper submitted by Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia to the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts, Doc. CDDH/DT/2 (Feb. 21, 1974)).
246. See Louis Maresca, A New Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War: The History and
Negotiation of Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 815, 817–22 (2004) (recounting meetings that led to
production of Protocol V to the CCW).
247. See David Kaye & Steven A. Solomon, The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
922 (2002).
248. Protocol [V to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
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number of NGO calls for CCW bans and moratoriums on use of cluster
munitions in favor of regulations governing technical features and duties
with respect to post-combat removal of ordnance.249 Specifically, States
rejected calls to ban use of cluster bombs against military objectives located
in concentrations of civilians, a provision similar to that included in the
preceding CCW Protocol III on incendiaries.250
Meetings convened since 2003 have considered means to further limit
or condition use of cluster munitions, but have not yet secured consensus
for any amendment to Protocol V nor have they worked toward a CCW
ban on cluster munitions as some had hoped. At the Third CCW Review
Conference, twenty-six States supported a CCW protocol addressed specifically to cluster munitions, however, their proposal failed.251 Norway, dissatisfied with Protocol V, to the surprise of many participants in the CCW
process proposed an international ban on cluster munitions separate from
the CCW regime near the end of the 2006 CCW Third Review Conference.252 The Oslo Process ultimately produced the Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM) concluded in 2008.253 Unlike the CCW process, the procedures used to develop the CCM did not require absolute consensus,
though rules of procedure strongly encouraged pursuit of consensus over
the alternative two-thirds majority rule.254
The CCM prohibits parties to “[u]se . . . , [d]evelop, produce, otherwise
acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster
munitions.”255 Like the Ottawa Convention with respect to landmines, the
CCM also regulates State parties’ actions with respect to military operations
Have Indiscriminate Effects] on Explosive Remnants of War, Nov. 28, 2003, 2399
U.N.T.S. 100.
249. Boothby, Cluster Bombs, supra note 242, at 15.
250. Id.
251. Proposal for a Mandate to Negotiate a Legally-Binding Instrument that Addresses the Humanitarian Concerns Posed by Cluster Munitions, Third Review Conference of States Parties to
the CCW, Geneva, Doc. CCW/CONF.III/WP.1 (Oct. 25, 2006).
252. Wiebe, Borrie & Smyth, supra note 233, at 16.
253. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter
2008 CCM]. Norway has developed over time a reputation for pushing the humanitarian
limits of the law of war. For instance, at the Diplomatic Convention for Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Norway made a particularly radical proposal to eliminate the traditional legal distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts. See 1977 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 1328 & n.31.
254. Rules of Procedure, Dublin Diplomatic Conference r. 36 ¶ 1, Diplomatic Conference Doc. CCM/52 (May 19, 2008).
255. 2008 CCM, supra note 253, art. 1.
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of allies not party to the Convention. CCM Parties may not “assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party
under [the] Convention.”256 Despite its quite comprehensive ban, the CCM
includes an important provision on interoperability that proved essential to
States’ acceptance of the Convention at its diplomatic conference in Dublin. Article 21(3) provides, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of
this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties,
their military personnel or nations may engage in military cooperation and
operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in
activities prohibited to a State Party.”
States have ratified or acceded to the CCM relatively rapidly in response to aggressive public campaigns designed to stigmatize the use of
cluster munitions. There are already ninety-three States party to the
CCM.257 The list of State parties includes strong representation among
NATO members. Notable non-party States include China, Russia, India,
Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States. The conclusion and entry into
force of the CCM has likely reduced enthusiasm for pursuing a CCW ban
on cluster munitions; however, a number of States possessing cluster munitions appeared interested in sustaining the CCW process as a means of regulation, perhaps to compete with the CCM.258 At present, their efforts have
not met with success.259 Until these States experience significant changes of
opinion with respect to the effectiveness of cluster munitions or a replacement emerges for these widely deployed weapons, however, both ratification of the CCM and negotiation of a CCW protocol seem unlikely.
K. Flechettes
In addition to provoking attention to incendiaries, cluster munitions and
landmines, the Vietnam War sparked interest in regulating or banning
flechette projectiles. After sporadic use in ancient warfare and their first
significant use in the First World War, flechettes evolved by the mid256. Id.
257. Chapter XXVO, Disarmament, Convention on Cluster Munitions, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXVI-6&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited July 29, 2015).
258. Wiebe, Borrie & Smyth, supra note 233, at 19.
259 Bonnie Docherty, Ending Civilian Suffering: The Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of
Humanitarian Disarmament Law, 15 AUSTRIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 7, 42–43 (2013) (noting that 50 States parties resisted and ultimately defeated a
U.S.-led proposal to develop a CCW cluster munitions protocol in 2011).
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twentieth century into small dart or nail-like projectiles usually launched in
mass quantities by an explosive charge or shell.260 Designed for antipersonnel use, flechettes (or “beehive” rounds) were credited with the repulsion of a number of determined attacks against lightly defended firebases during the Vietnam War.261 They have also, however, been condemned
as indiscriminate and capable of inflicting unnecessary suffering on combatants. The possibility that flechettes may deform or fragment on impact
led to the allegation that, like expanding bullets, they cause wounds greater
than that necessary to incapacitate combatants.262 Because of their small
size, low weight and slim aerodynamic profile, flechettes travel at extraordinarily high speed. Injuries from shock waves produced by high-speed
impact with human tissue inspired many early objections to the use of projectiles that travel at similarly high velocity.263 It was thought by some that
these shock waves produced injury in excess of that needed to render targets hors de combat.
Despite these objections, efforts to ban or regulate flechettes have
failed consistently. Efforts of the early 1970s met rejection reportedly because of the sparse use of flechettes. At the time, the United States was the
only State to acknowledge that it had flechettes in its inventory and expressed “keen interest in retaining” them.264 Defenders of flechettes emphasized that any issue of indiscriminateness was attributable to improper
use rather than to the nature of the projectiles themselves.265 Defenders
also rejected conclusions that flechettes cause injuries more grave than other projectiles in common use.266
Interest in regulating flechettes decreased after these early attempts,
with flechettes attracting only sporadic mention at weapons conferences,
including the CCW process.267 Meanwhile, flechettes failed to demonstrate
much staying power in the weapons inventories of major powers. Despite
their apparent utility and effectiveness, the United States phased them out
260. Eric Prokosch, Technology and Its Control: Antipersonnel Weapons, 28 INTERNATIONSOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL 341, 344, 348–49 (1976), available at http://unesdo
c.unesco.org/images/0001/000197/019707eo.pdf#19712.
261. EITAN BARAK, DEADLY METAL RAIN: THE LEGALITY OF FLECHETTE WEAPONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–47 (2011).
262. LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, ¶ 210, at 59.
263. Id.
264. BARAK, supra note 261, at 66.
265. Id. at 68.
266. Id. (citing LUCERNE REPORT, supra note 8, ¶ 215, at 61).
267. Id. at 75–85.
AL
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by the 1980s, most notably from its arsenal of tank rounds.268 It is likely
that technical advances in cluster munitions account for the displacement
of flechettes as favored anti-personnel weapons. At present, Israel appears
to be the only major military power that acquires and employs flechettes in
significant quantities.269
L. Chemical Weapons
Relative to efforts to regulate other weapons, enthusiasm for international
regulation of chemical weapons emerged and became established early in
their development.270 At the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, most States
immediately perceived chemical weapons as substantially different from
other weapons under consideration for regulation. Price has observed in
addressing the agreement produced at the Conference, “The unique aspect
of the emergent CW [chemical weapons] norm . . . is that it did not . . .
simply ban particular uses of such shells (e.g. against civilians), while implicitly conferring legitimacy upon their use against soldiers in the field. Rather, the Hague declaration took the form of a more absolute prohibition . .
. .”271
States’ early enthusiasm for regulation of chemical weapons is in one
respect surprising, yet in another respect foreseeable. The surprising aspect
of States’ early regulation of chemical weapons is their nascent state of development at the time. Chemical weapons, especially those delivered by
projectile, were not widely fielded by the States which ratified the 1899 ban
on their use. In fact, uncertainty as to their effects and military necessity led
the United States to withhold support for the ban and subsequent regulation of chemical weapons for over five decades.
The foreseeable aspect of the early ban on chemical weapons relates to
the inherent characteristics or nature of these weapons. Although the
Hague conference attendees addressed them, and current law regards them
as separate means subject to separate prohibitions, chemical weapons and
268. Id. at 49.
269. Id. at 3–4.
270. But see Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms against Chemical and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 391, 400 (2003)
(arguing that legal and social norms against chemical weapon use have never been straightforward, unambiguous or uncontested).
271. Price, supra note 93, at 90 (addressing Declaration (IV, 2) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29,
1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 453, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998).
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poison elicit many of the same human reactions.272 Defenders characterized
early chemical attacks of the First World War as “poisonous.”273 Asserting
similarities between poison and chemical weapons, Professor van Courtland Moon offers this observation from a World War I memoir:
You always felt this poison gas was so mean and treacherous. It wasn’t so
much the harm it did to the body, which was always much over-estimated
in the popular imagination, as the harm it did to the mind. A shell might
make terrible wounds, but its burst was all over in an instant. It was a case
of hit or miss which left no ill-will behind. But this harmless-looking, almost invisible, stuff would lie for days on end lurking in low places waiting for the unwary. It was the Devil’s breath. It was Ahrimanic from the
first velvety phut of the shell burst to those corpse-like breaths that a man
inhaled almost unawares. It lingered about out of control. When he fired
it, man released an evil force that became free to bite friend or foe till
such time as it died into the earth.274

Perceptions of chemical weapons also parallel poison in that they are
characterized as a “weapon of the weak.”275 Often derided as “the poor
man’s bomb,” chemical weapons have been depicted as a crude and uncivilized alternative sought out by poor and technologically unsophisticated
powers attempting to level the odds of combat with technically and militarily superior powers. Indeed, chemical weapons have been used often in
conflicts between asymmetrically equipped forces.276 If poison was the
weapon of choice for the disempowered seeking to displace powerful
kings, chemical weapons represent a modern analog in their capacity to
hamstring the most efficient and powerful armed forces.277
272. See id. at 80. But see Zanders, supra note 270, at 407–8 (emphasizing post-Hague,
German and Allied distinctions between poisons and chemical weapons).
273. See van Courtland Moon, supra note 83, at 64 (quoting John French’s Despatch
of 15 June 1915. Sir John French’s Eighth Despatch, THE LONG, LONG TRAIL,
http://www.1914-1918.net/french_eighth_despatch.html).
274. van Courtland Moon, supra note 83, at 73 (quoting ARTHUR ALAN HANBURYSPARROW, THE LAND-LOCKED LAKE 309–10 (1932)).
275. Price, supra note 93, at 98.
276. W. Hays Parks, Classification of Chemical-Biological Warfare, 13 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW 1165, 1166 (1982) [hereinafter Parks, Chemical-Biological Warfare] (citing
Jack F. Calvert, Chemical Weapons: Problems and Policy Formulations, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 1-2 (1981)).
277. See Donald B. Headley, Gerald A. Hudgens & Donald Cunningham, The Impact of
Chemical Protective Clothing on Military Operational Performance, 9 MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 359,
359 (1997) (noting the chemical protective clothing limits “dexterity, mobility, command
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Accounts of the effectiveness of the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration vary.
The prevailing view regards the Declaration’s ban on chemical weapons as
a failure in light of widespread use of chemical shells by both sides in the
First World War.278 Estimates indicate that belligerents fired as many as
sixty-six million gas shells dispersing over 124,000 tons of chemical agents,
affecting over one million soldiers.279 In fact, gas use in the First World
War became so horrific that by 1918 it provoked an exceedingly rare public
appeal from the ICRC.280
A more nuanced view, however, notes that both sides refrained from
use for a considerable period of the war, likely due to the influence of the
1899 ban and the negative political discourse it provoked.281 This refined
view suggests a stronger political and human reluctance to resort to chemical weapons then the general military history of the First World War reveals.
Inspired by the horrors of First World War battlefields, States renewed
efforts to regulate chemical weapons, first through the failed Washington
Treaty of 1922282 and later through the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol.283 While
the Washington agreement banned chemical warfare, the Washington conand control, communications, and endurance”); John L. Kobrick & Bernard J. Fine, Effect
of Heat and Chemical Clothing on Cognitive Performance, 58 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 149 (1983) (noting 17–23 percent increases in soldiers’ cognitive errors
after seven hours of heat exposure in chemical protective clothing).
278. ANN VAN WYNEN & A. J. THOMAS JR., LEGAL LIMITS ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 141 (1970).
279. See GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 90 (citing ALAN KRAMER, DYNAMIC OF DESTRUCTION: CULTURE AND MASS KILLING IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR (2007)).
280. Rainer Baudendistel, Force Versus Law: The International Committee of the Red Cross
and Chemical Warfare in the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–1936, 80 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE RED CROSS 81, 94, 98 (1998). The ICRC maintains a policy of strict confidentiality. It
keeps secret all information gathered from parties to conflicts during its humanitarian activities. Decisions to go public with information concerning breaches or to confront belligerents publicly with violations of the law of war have been exceptionally rare. The organization more commonly consults privately with parties to advocate compliance with
international legal obligations. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Policy Document, The International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC’s) Confidential Approach: Specific Means
Employed by the ICRC to Ensure Respect for the Law by State and non-State Authorities, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1135 (2012).
281. Price, supra note 93, at 91–92.
282. Submarines and Gases Treaty, supra note 154.
283. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter 1925 Geneva Protocol].
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ference did not manage to secure ratification of any of its work. However,
just three years later under the League of Nations, negotiations implementing the Treaty of Versailles which ended the First World War284 produced
the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, binding parties to ban “the use in war of all
asphyxiating, poisonous, and other gases,” as well as “bacteriological methods of warfare.”285 Parties also stipulated that the prohibition was “universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience
and the practice of nations.”286
Despite the apparent universal character of the chemical weapons taboo, major powers were willing to ratify the 1925 Gas Protocol only with
significant reservations. The most important reservations limited the Protocol’s operation to conditions of reciprocal observance by other parties.
The French government reservations are representative, providing:
The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the French Republic as regards States which have signed or ratified it or which may accede to it.
The said Protocol shall ipso facto cease to be binding on the Government
of the French Republic in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces
or whose Allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.287

Notwithstanding States’ surprising and still-unexplained forbearance
with respect to chemical weapons during the Second World War, the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol and its customary law byproduct288 did not manage
to stem resort to chemical weapons entirely.289 Substantiated allegations of
their use have been made in the 1935 Italo-Abyssinian War, the 1937 SinoJapanese War, the 1963 Yemeni War and, most notably, the 1980s Iran284. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany art. 171,
June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188 (Versailles Treaty).
285. 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 283. See also Zanders, supra note 270, at 398
(discussing impact of the Versailles Treaty provisions on Germany’s chemical weapons).
286. 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 283, para. 3.
287. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 165.
288. See ICRC CIL STUDY, supra note 11, r. 73, at 259.
289. Japan proved an exception to the Second World War belligerents’ restraint at
employing chemical weapons. The Japanese Army used chemical artillery shells repeatedly
during its invasion of China resulting in large-scale casualties among soldiers and civilians.
See GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 92.
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Iraq War.290 The latter two episodes of gas use, like that of the First World
War, provoked truly exceptional public appeals from the ICRC.291 Still,
among the hundreds of armed conflicts of the twentieth century, only six
featured use of chemical weapons.292
In later developments, especially at the formative stages of the 1977
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, States’ experts
quickly rejected weapons of mass destruction from consideration.293 Interests of comity toward efforts already underway under UN auspices and a
preference for promoting adoption and implementation of existing regulations such as the 1925 Gas Protocol seem to have motivated the experts to
steer clear of addressing weapons of mass destruction through the ICRCconvened process.294 Proposals at 1972 and 1973 conferences included no
reference to regulation of weapons of mass destruction—or any other specific weapons for that matter—although select States attempted, unsuccessfully, to resurrect weapons regulation during the process.295 States similarly
rejected consideration of chemical weapons and other non-conventional
weapons in the UN-sponsored CCW process; however, a separate negotiation was soon underway.

290. JOENNIEMI & ROSAS, supra note 36, at 33. See also Baudendistal, supra note 280, at
83–85, 99 (noting an Italian admission of gas use); Parks, Chemical-Biological Warfare, supra
note 276, at 1166 (alleging use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union during its 1980
invasion of Afghanistan) (citing Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Memorandum
of Law: Reported Use of Chemical Agents in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea 6–7
(Apr. 9, 1980)).
291. Baudendistel, supra note 280, at 102 n.34.
292. Cole, supra note 84, at 119.
293. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA, 24 MAY–12 JUNE 1971:
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ¶¶ 476–77 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS].
294. Id. ¶ 477.
295. Egypt, Finland, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia argued most persistently to include weapons regulations in the work of the conferences. See 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON
THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, SECOND SESSION, GENEVA, 3 MAY–3 JUNE 1972:
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE 57 (1972). The proposal would have prohibited entirely delayed-action weapons, incendiary weapons and small caliber fragmentation bombs. Id. The proposal drew the support of experts from Algeria, Austria, Kuwait,
Libya, Mali, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Id.
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With the Iran-Iraq conflict firmly in mind, States convened the 1989
Paris Conference to strengthen and update the chemical weapons ban.296
The Final Declaration of the conference indicated States’ eager desire to
conclude a new convention to address chemical weapons.297 Meanwhile, a
thawing of Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union made feasible the verification measures that many States had demanded precede regulation of chemical weapons beyond the first use prohibited by the 1925 Gas Protocol. The Paris Conference produced international legislative momentum that culminated in the 1993 Convention on
Chemical Weapons (CWC).298 Reports indicate that although its development was prolonged, the CWC was concluded with relative ease.299
The CWC added a number of significant improvements over its predecessor. First, it reiterated the customary and 1925 Protocol bans on use of
chemical weapons, although without the State reciprocity reservations that
had accompanied the latter’s ban.300 Second, the CWC added provisions
that forbid State parties to “develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile
or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical
weapons to anyone.”301 Third, it prohibits State parties to “assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party.”302 Lastly, the CWC obliged State parties to destroy their existing arsenals of chemical weapons and production facilities303 and included
an elaborate regime of verification inspections.304
Not long after the CWC took shape, States reiterated their support for
the chemical weapons ban in the ICC Statute, which includes violation of
the ban among war crimes subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.305 And recently, reports of Syrian chemical weapons use against insurgents in the
296. See Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Final Declaration (Jan. 11, 1989),
reprinted in 28 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1020 (1989). See also Pierre Morel, The
Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 12 DISARMAMENT 127 (1989).
297. Final Declaration, supra note 296, Annex, ¶ 3.
298. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45
[hereinafter 1993 CWC].
299. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 96.
300. 1993 CWC, supra note 298, art. I (1)(b).
301. Id., art. I (1)(a).
302. Id., art. I (1)(d).
303. Id., arts. I (2)–(4), IV, V.
304. Id.
305. ICC Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 8(2)(b)(xviii).
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current civil war have appeared in numerous media. Although Syria was
not a State party to the CWC at the time, international concern and objections to Syrian chemical weapons stocks proved sufficiently grave to inspire
the UN Security Council to take action, the historic Syrian-Russian alliance
notwithstanding.306
Despite their infrequent use and extensive production and deployment,
chemical weapons appear capable of mustering consistent international
condemnation—legal and political—rivaled only by poison and perhaps
biological weapons.
M. Biological and Bacteriological Weapons
Long before humans developed sophisticated understandings of bacteria,
viruses and toxins, armies appreciated the potential of incorporating biological agents and pathogens into their arsenals. Ancient practices of warfare included driving diseased animals into enemy lines, lacing weapons
with feces and rotted organisms’ remains, and introducing plague and other
diseases into enemy forces and populations.307 Even without deliberate
human assistance, disease has long been a conspicuous feature of warfare.
It is frequently thought that casualties of nature’s agents—cholera, typhus,
tuberculosis, plague, malaria, influenza and the like—have outpaced those
of manmade weapons in many conflicts.308
A number of factors, including their affordability, ease of manufacture
and ability to self-multiply, have made biological weapons especially worrisome and therefore targets of regulation.309 Extraordinarily small doses of
pathogens can result in infection.310 Once infected, a host can transmit
communicable diseases to new hosts by any number of pathways.311 Advances in aerosol delivery added drastically to the dangers of biological
weapons. Aerosol forms greatly decreased the amounts of pathogens needed, significantly facilitated chances of infection and notably increased le306. S.C. Res. 2209, ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2209 (Mar. 6, 2015).
307. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 102–3.
308. Id. at 104. Gillespie reports that disease killed more combatants than did bullets
during both the Franco-Prussian and Spanish-American Wars. Id. During 1918, 60 percent
of deaths of U.S. troops were by influenza. Id.
309. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 100, 102.
310. GREGORY D. KOBLENTZ, LIVING WEAPONS: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 9 (2009).
311. Id.
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thality.312 Biological weapons also offer significant advantages to attackers
given the diversity of agents, their potency, the ease of achieving surprise
and the extreme difficulty of mounting an effective defense.313
Although they saw no documented use in the First World War, bacteriological weapons received special attention from the League of Nations in
disarmament proceedings following the war. Like poisons, biological
weapons frustrate and erode centuries of human effort to acquire medical
knowledge and techniques for survival. The prospect of uncontrolled epidemic and blowback against an attacker further fuels human revulsion of
these weapons. They are not only by nature indiscriminate between combatant and civilian, but also between enemy and friend. A committee assigned to study special weapons concluded “bacteriological warfare ought
to be included in qualitative disarmament . . . . It is so particularly odious
that it revolts the conscience of humanity more than any other method of
warfare.”314 These views were reflected in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,
which had banned not only chemical weapons use, but also “the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare.”315
Enthusiasm for regulating bacteriological methods notwithstanding, the
Protocol’s ban proved inadequate in three important respects. First, it
made no effort to define the scope of its prohibition. No definition or
technical annex accompanies the Protocol. Second, as with its treatment of
chemical weapons, it did not prohibit development, production or stockpiling of biological weapons. Finally, the bacteriological ban fell prey to extensive reservations with respect to reciprocity filed by many State parties.316
By the 1970s, these shortcomings, evidenced by the horrific use of biological weapons by Japan during the Second World War317 and frightening
developments in States’ capacity to produce and disseminate biological

312. Id. at 15.
313. Id. at 22.
314. Kalshoven, Arms, supra note 8, at 221 (quoting League of Nations, Conf. D.120.,
¶ 11 (May 31, 1932)).
315. 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 283, para. 4.
316. Reservations, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at
116–23.
317. See GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 107–8 (citing DANIEL BARENBLATT, A PLAGUE
UPON HUMANITY (2004); SHELDON H. HARRIS, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: 1932–45 (1995)). Gillespie reports conservative estimates of as many
as 500,000 Chinese biological weapon casualties. GILLESPIE, supra, at 107.
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agents,318 provoked sufficient concern to update the law. By 1972, States
concluded the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction.319 In addition to reinforcing the 1925 Protocol’s ban on
use, the 1972 Convention effectively rendered biological weapons international contraband, except for narrow purposes related to research. Although it, curiously, does not address use of biological weapons directly, the
Convention’s prohibitions on their development, stockpiling and production render use practically impossible.320 Moreover, State parties to the
Convention confirmed at their Fourth Review Conference an understanding that use was prohibited.321
Air Commodore Boothby assesses the Biological Convention as “arguably, the first treaty to have prohibited entirely a category of weapon.”322
Currently, there are 171 State parties to the Biological Convention.323 Since
the Convention’s entry into force, scheduled review conferences have focused on developing binding verification measures acceptable to States.324
Greatly complicating efforts to verify compliance with the Convention and
undermining its effectiveness at eliminating biological weapons is the “multiuse dilemma.” Koblentz notes “the skills, materials, and technology needed to produce biological weapons are also necessary to develop defenses
against them and to conduct civilian activities such as biomedical research
and pharmaceutical production.”325 Multiuse, combined with their nearly
318. GILLESPIE, supra note 76, at 107 (reporting that during the Cold War most military powers developed extensive biological weapons arsenals).
319. Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter 1972 Biological Convention].
320. See id., art. I.
321. See Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva, 25 November–6 December 1996,
Final Document, at 14, Doc. BWC/CONF.IV/9 (1996), available at http://www.opbw.
org/rev_cons/4rc/docs/rev_con_docs/i_docs/IV-09.pdf.
322. BOOTHBY, supra note 103, at 126. See also KOBLENTZ, supra note 310, at 4–5.
323. Treaties Database, Status of the Treaty, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/ treaties/t/bwc (last visited July 29, 2015).
324. See, e.g., Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Doc.
BWC/MSP/2014/5 (Dec. 15, 2014).
325. KOBLENTZ, supra note 310, at 5.
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unrivaled capacity to inflict mass casualties through self-propagation and
spread, makes biological weapons at once a tempting and problematic
weapon despite apparently manifest State zeal for their prohibition.
N. Nuclear Weapons
Since their advent, nuclear weapons have been the object of persistent efforts with respect to both arms control and specific law of war regulation
or prohibition. As with other weapons of mass destruction, however, States
have regularly excluded nuclear weapons from consideration in general development of the law of war applicable to weapons. Yet unlike chemical
and biological weapons, nuclear weapons are subject to no form of independent law of war regulation. In fact, they may be regarded by some
States to exist outside the realm of conventional law of war regulation altogether.
State exceptionalism with respect to nuclear weapons and law of war
development dates to the immediate aftermath of their use at the end of
the Second World War. After brief flashes of almost utopian interest in
international stewardship of nuclear materials, nuclear States swiftly adopted stances against law of war regulation of nuclear weapons. States rejected
early proposals to incorporate regulation of nuclear weapons into either the
1925 Geneva Protocol regime or the 1949 Geneva Conventions.326 The
expert meetings and diplomatic conference that produced the 1977 Additional Protocols saw several proposals to address nuclear weapons; however, each attempt met again with insistence that nuclear weapons were not a
topic for discussion at these conferences.327 Not content to let these travaux
préparatoires or even the agreed upon Protocols speak for themselves, a
number of States reiterated their objections to including nuclear weapons
in the ambit of the Protocols’ rules with nuclear weapon exclusionary
statements on signature and accession. French and UK statements are representative providing, respectively:
Referring to the draft protocol drawn up by the International Committee
of the Red Cross which constituted the basis of 1974–1977 Diplomatic
Conference, the Government of the French Republic continues to consider that the Protocol’s provisions concern exclusively conventional

326. Kalshoven, Arms, supra note 8, at 271–73.
327. 1971 REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 293, ¶ 477.
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weapons and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons . . . .328
It continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom that the
rules introduced by the Protocol apply exclusively to conventional weapons without prejudice to any other rules of international law applicable to
other types of weapons. In particular, the rules so introduced do not have
any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.329

Nuclear legal exceptionalism was not the exclusive view of nuclear
powers nor AP I parties. Non-nuclear States, especially NATO members
benefitting from the deterrence postures of allied nuclear powers affirmed
the view that the Protocols had no application to nuclear weapons as
well.330 And although not a party to the Protocols, the United States submitted an understanding at the time of its signature stating, “the rules established by this protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do
not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.”331 Attempts to incorporate nuclear weapons regulation into the UN-sponsored weapons regulation processes met resistance from States as well. Indeed the very title of
the proceedings and resulting treaty confirm as much with their prominent
reference to “Certain Conventional Weapons.”
Even by the mid-1990s, amid thawing of Cold War postures, it seems
nuclear powers’ resolve to except nuclear weapons from regulation remained largely unabated. In 1993, the World Health Organization prompted an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) con328. France, Reservations and Declarations Made on Accession to Protocol I, reprinted
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 800.
329. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Reservations and Declarations made on Ratification, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13,
at 815.
330. Belgium, Declaration of Interpretation Made on Ratification, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 795; Canada, Reservations and Declarations Made at the Time of Ratification, Statements of Understanding (Conventional
Weapons), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 797; Germany, Declarations Made at the Time of Ratification, ¶ 1, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS,
supra, at 802; Italy, Declarations Made on Ratification, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra, at 807; Netherlands, Declarations Made on Ratification, ¶ 1, reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 810; Spain, Interpretive Declarations Made at
the Time of Ratification, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 813.
331. United States, Declaration Made on Signature, ¶ 1, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 13, at 810.
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cerning the legality of nuclear weapons under international law.332 The
Court devoted specific attention to the status of nuclear weapons under the
law of war. Nuclear powers reiterated positions held throughout the weapons conferences of the 1970s and 1980s. The United States submitted a
representative statement in response to the litigation that provided, “It is
apparent that none of [the Protocol I] prohibitions was negotiated with
nuclear weapons in mind and would not have been adopted had they been
thought to be applicable to nuclear weapons.”333
Though firm in their rejection of the application of the “new” and finely-tuned rules of Additional Protocol I to nuclear weapons, States did not
characterize use of nuclear weapons as entirely extra-legal. Even the United
States admitted that, at minimum, the principles of discrimination and unnecessary suffering operated with respect to nuclear weapons.334 The ICJ
concluded similarly, confirming the cardinal principles of discrimination
and unnecessary suffering and advised that nuclear weapons use would
generally violate the law of war.335 However, the Court ultimately advised
that it “cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality”
of nuclear weapons per se.336 The advisory opinion, combined with States’
views on non-application of the Additional Protocol I refinements to targeting law, have left regulation of nuclear weapons largely to the uncertainties and ambiguities of law of war custom and principles. Ultimately, nuclear weapons have proved remarkably regulation resistant. Not even the prospect of human annihilation has proved sufficient to overcome nuclear
States’ confirmed belief that these widely deployed weapons, offering
unique military advantage, should remain free from any specific law of war
restraints.

332. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
333. Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America 28 (June
10, 1994), Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/8770.pdf.
334. Id. at 26–29.
335. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J., ¶¶ 78, 85, 97.
336. Id. ¶ 97.
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IDENTIFYING REGULATION TOLERANCE
AND REGULATION RESISTANCE

As the preceding surveys of law of war principles and specific regulations
have illustrated, States and private actors that seek to establish law of war
limits on weapons face significant uncertainties. Even with widely acknowledged principles to guide the regulation of weapons, weapons law proponents face a difficult task securing sufficient agreement on the precise content and meaning of these principles to achieve meaningful and effective
limitations on weapons. And despite a noteworthy catalog of specific treaties to regulate and even ban certain weapons, the challenge of convincing
the vastly heterogeneous community of States, and especially that of militarily significant States, to go along often prevents even the most logical
and attractive humanitarian limitations from succeeding. Meanwhile, in
many cases the immense investments of political, diplomatic and financial
capital required greatly reduce opportunities for progress. Therefore, assessing the prospects of success in advance of any campaign to advance
weapons law is a matter of equal difficulty and importance.
The three principles of unnecessary suffering, discrimination and honor
certainly remain the primary indicators for predicting regulatory success.
States have obviously coalesced around views that some weapons violate
these law of war principles per se. For example, non-detectable fragments
presented a sufficiently compelling case with respect to unnecessary suffering to achieve consensus among CCW parties. Early in the twentieth century, States quickly agreed that biological weapons could not be used consistent with the principle of discrimination. And poison seems clearly to
have run afoul of most States’ senses of the honor and good faith required
by the principle prohibiting treacherous means that has existed for the majority of recorded history.
Yet clearly, forces and considerations beyond these law of war principles have played important parts in successful and failed efforts to regulate
weapons through the law of war. The historical record recounted above
suggests that further factors—factors associated with the weapons themselves—have also influenced States’ receptivity to or rejection of law of war
regulation. This Part identifies these factors, associates them with historical
weapons law efforts and correlates each, to the extent possible, with regulation tolerance or resistance in future weapons law efforts. Specifically, the
traits of effectiveness, novelty, deployment, medical compatibility, disruptiveness and notoriety will be identified with various historical efforts to
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regulate weapons and characterized with respect to regulation tolerance or
resistance.
A. Effectiveness
The most important factor in evaluating States’ willingness to regulate a
weapon may be that of effectiveness. Efficacy in terms of permitting a belligerent to impose its will on an enemy is, after all, the raison d’être of weapons. Accordingly, the historical record shows that States have rarely been
willing to forfeit the service of a truly effective weapon in the name of humanity. Bans on weapons such as non-detectable fragments and chemical
and biological weapons may be just as much reflections of relative ineffectiveness as these weapons’ propensity to inflict unnecessary suffering. To
better understand effectiveness and to account for historical examples as
accurately as possible, two notions of effectiveness can be identified. Effectiveness with respect to access and effectiveness with respect to securing
dominance or victory prove separate and useful indicators not only of battlefield outcomes, but also of regulatory results.
Access constitutes a critical facet of weapon capabilities. Weapons that
give unprecedented access have not only achieved remarkable tactical success, but have also proved capable of tipping the operational and strategic
balance of armed conflict. In particular, weapons capable of providing access to previously inaccessible enemy forces and vulnerabilities have
proved, at least until adequate defenses are devised and fielded, some of
the most influential and effective weapons in history.
Although true primarily at exceptionally low tactical levels, incendiaries
greatly expanded attackers’ access to entrenched and fortified defenders in
ways that few other weapons could rival or mimic. When employed against
flammable defensive materials, incendiaries can extend an attacker’s reach
far beyond the point of initial contact. When projected by pressurized
means, flammable liquids are capable of reaching enemy forces in confined
areas and reaching even further when they ignite materials that surround
defenders. Although chemical gases and biological aerosols have also
proved capable of permeating complex defenses, their residual effects, expense, delay in achieving effects and, most importantly, their potential for
blowback on friendly forces make them far inferior to portable incendiaries. Thus, despite intense campaigns to outlaw their use and compelling
concern for the intense suffering they inflict on victims, incendiaries have
proved remarkably resistant to regulation due in no small part to their abil609
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ity to give effective access to enemy vulnerabilities. While CCW Protocol
III managed to limit their use in areas of civilian concentration, incendiaries
remain an entirely lawful weapon against military objectives and enemy
combatants because, in large part, they provide nearly inimitable access and
effective ability to achieve the desired effects.
Effectiveness in terms of access to enemy vulnerabilities has proved an
important consideration for more than weapons. By providing access required for effective attacks, delivery platforms such as missiles, aircraft,
vessels and vehicles have played a crucial role in the history of warfare.
Consistent with reluctance to regulate weapons that provide effective access to enemy forces, States have proved especially reluctant to accept
regulations on means of delivery that provide improved battlefield access.
Although the First Hague Peace conference included a declaration banning
use of balloons to deliver projectiles and explosives,337 that instrument
proved to be exceptionally short-lived and ineffective. Drafted to expire
after five years, the 1899 Hague Declaration IV was renewed in 1907;338
however, several parties to the 1899 Declaration did not ratify the 1907
Declaration, including France, Germany, Japan and Russia. And while
technically still in force, the 1907 Declaration proved unable to restrict aerial bombardment in any significant manner in subsequent conflicts. Regulation of aerial bombardment moved away from restraints on aircraft per se
and toward regulation of how and against which targets they could lawfully
be used. The tactically and strategically critical access that new means of
delivery made available throughout the twentieth century rendered them in
nearly all cases exceptionally regulation resistant. Throughout the twentieth
century, States consistently rejected attempts to develop limits on aircraft,
submarines and other means of delivering weapons. Given the value States
attach to effectiveness in terms of access to enemy vulnerabilities, emerging
means of weapon delivery, especially those that increase access, seem likely
to prove similarly regulation resistant.
337. Declaration (IV, 1) to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of
Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, and other Methods of Similar a Nature, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1839, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 994, 1 Bevans 270, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 74, at 309. See also Eric Talbot Jensen,
Emerging Technologies and LOAC Signaling, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 621, 627–28
(2015) (recounting and analyzing the history and performance of the 1899 Balloons Declaration).
338. Declaration (XIV) Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from
Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3). 745, 36 Stat. 2439, 205 Consol. T.S. 403, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 76, at 309.
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Effectiveness can be also accounted for through a weapon’s capacity to
achieve dominance or even win wars. Some weapons have simply proved
to be game changers, tipping the tactical, operational and even strategic
balance in favor of those who wield them. Nuclear weapons surely represent the best example of weapons capable of imposing a decisive defeat on
even a determined and capable enemy. The United States’ use of atomic
bombs against Japan was an unprecedented example of how a single weapon can decisively alter, or at least greatly shorten, the course of an armed
conflict.
To be sure, war-winning effectiveness has often come at great cost in
terms of humanity. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, while militarily
decisive, came at the cost of immense civilian casualties. Moral complexities and even legal dilemmas provoked by their use persist decades later.
And the war-winning capacity of nuclear weapons in the present international security environment has been highly debatable for some time.339
Whether the strategic effects achieved by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombings could be replicated by nuclear weapons in a world that pits nuclear powers against one another developed into an entire field of study.
Regardless, nuclear States remain committed to the effectiveness of nuclear
weapons, either as war-winning weapons or as the only effective deterrents
to enemies who might seek to use them. Meanwhile, non-nuclear States are
expending enormous financial resources and political and human capital to
develop them. The perceived war-winning effectiveness of nuclear weapons, or the capacity to counter such use, surely explains a great deal about
States persistent rejection of law of war regulation of these terrifying weapons. Despite their shocking, near unjustifiable consequences, nuclear
weapons remain regulated by nothing more than the most general and abstract principles of the law of war. Although unimaginable at present, it is
likely that any new weapon with comparable war-winning capacity would
prove equally resistant to law of war regulation.
Conversely, weapons that are minimally or questionably effective have
proved in many cases to be quite susceptible to law of war regulation. Although widely deployed, chemical and biological weapons never appeared
339. See Theodore Richard, Nuclear Targeting and Military Objectives 33 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citing Presidential Directive 59/NSC-59 (July
25, 1980), available at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd5
9.pdf. Presidential Directive 59 ordered U.S. nuclear strategists to devise a plan of deterrence to make clear to the Soviet Union that nuclear attacks would not produce “any plausible definition of victory.” Id. at 1).
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to offer sufficient military advantage to be considered effective. Their chief
military value appears to be their capacity to terrorize or, in the case of
prepared defenders, to harass or momentarily hinder operations. Experience with the use of chemical weapons in the First World War did not reveal them to offer a war-winning contribution and States quickly agreed to
a significant though qualified ban on their use, followed later by a comprehensive ban. It is likely that weapons that can be proved to offer similarly
nominal military advantage will prove similarly susceptible to regulation.
Present campaigns to regulate weapons seem already to have integrated this
lesson into their efforts, offering detailed studies and data with respect to
military effectiveness, especially lack thereof.340
B. Novelty
Most developments in weapons have been evolutionary in nature. “New”
weapons have often proved simply to be improvements on existing designs, offering little change in the nature or true character of their predecessors. The very earliest stages of either development or deployment of
new weapons present a mixed experience. On one hand, States have
proved surprisingly willing to accept restraints on newly emerging technologies. Early twentieth century experience with aerial bombardment, biological weapons and chemical weapons indicate a surprising willingness to
regulate new military technology. On the other hand, States proved resistant to early efforts to regulate nuclear weapons, as well as blinding lasers
and submarines. The regulations developed with respect to the latter two
either required sustained and prolonged effort, or produced highly ineffective limitations. At present, a “wait and see” approach seems to prevail
with respect to prospective or early regulation of novel military technology.
Understanding the impact of novelty and innovation on regulatory acceptance or rejection may require a deeper understanding of military attitudes and culture.
O’Connell identifies military attitudes towards weapons as critical determinants of approval. In particular he notes that weapon ancestry predicts acceptance and suppression.341 Unsurprisingly, weapons that represent
evolutions of established families of armaments with identifiable heritages,
so-called “familiar compartments”—the missile to the catapult shot; the
340. See, e.g., FATALLY FLAWED, supra note 242 (noting the reduced military impact of
cluster bombs in light of high dud rates); ICRC, FRIEND OR FOE, supra note 189, at 40–46.
341. O’CONNELL, supra note 108, at 7.
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armored formation to the phalanx; the naval cruiser to the trireme—enjoy
ready acceptance.342 By contrast, new weapons lacking traceable ancestry
find themselves prone to suppression.343 Initial reactions to projectile
weapons, to submarines, to chemical weapons and to aerial warfare are historically representative.
Delving somewhat deeper into military acceptance and rejection of
weapons, O’Connell notes the military profession’s preferences for decorum and predictability.344 He observes,
The urge to bring weapons under a specific body of rules and regulations
would seem to have more than just a pragmatic basis. The ritualization of
combat, as opposed to the more laissez-faire approach exemplified in
predatory behavior, has always provided a major theme in weapons development, and one that cannot be attributed wholly to humanistic motives. Rather, it follows that the inclination to fight by the rules, to use
similar weapons in a prescribed fashion, is a vestige of intraspecific combat.”345

Although presently in decline, military professionals’ role in law of war
formation has historically been significant. Military commanders and staff
officers were frequent participants in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century diplomatic conferences that produced law of war instruments. The
records of committee meetings and plenary sessions alike feature their perspectives and indicate a high degree of deference toward their views, especially with respect to weapons regulations. So long as States accommodate
military participation in weapons law conferences and diplomatic conventions, novelty, and by implication military reactions to novel weapons, will
prove important indicators of regulation tolerance and resistance.
C. Deployment
Not far removed from novelty, but nonetheless sufficiently distinct to merit separate consideration, is deployment. In this context, deployment refers
to the extent to which a weapon has been acquired, fielded and integrated
into States’ military operations. Weapons that have not yet been deployed
342. Id. at 6.
343. Id at 7.
344. Id. at 8.
345. Id. at 24.
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by States have proved somewhat tolerant of efforts at regulation or prohibition. Not surprisingly, widely deployed systems have proved, at least for
long periods, to be prohibition resistant, but by no means prohibition
proof. The record of widely deployed weapons with respect to regulation,
rather than prohibition, has been somewhat more promising; States have
proven occasionally willing to accept regulations on the use of widely deployed weapons, but not to their ban.
The notion that States might prove willing to regulate weapons that are
not yet widely deployed, and therefore not widely combat tested, is supported by significant experience. At the time of the 1899 Hague Gas Declaration, chemical weapons were not widely deployed among the major powers’ armed forces, nor had they yet seen significant battlefield use. At the
time the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol addressed biological weapons, few
States were thought to have fielded those weapons in operationally significant numbers.
More recently, Protocol IV to the CCW banned use of lasers designed
to inflict blindness before any State had deployed or employed any such
weapon in combat, a phenomenon often remarked on by weapons law
commentators.346 Accounts of the effort to ban blinding lasers showcase
reports that the U.S. Army had at least ten laser weapon systems in development at the time of the UN conference that produced Protocol IV.347
Most major military powers were believed to have laser weapon programs
at the time as well.348 However, these systems seem to have been developed
primarily to frustrate or incapacitate optical detection systems, and not as
anti-personnel blinding systems.349
For States and other actors interested in regulating widely deployed
weapons, experience with regulating anti-personnel landmines and cluster
munitions counsels patience and persistence. Both landmines and cluster
munitions saw widespread deployment—the former in great numbers
among a great number of armies, the latter, owing to technical sophistication and expense, in great numbers among significantly fewer, but still very
large militaries. Campaigns to prohibit both weapons originated in the late
346. See, e.g., BOOTHBY, supra note 103, at 209 (citing Robert J. Mathews, The 1980
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: A Useful Framework Despite Earlier Disappointments,
83 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 991(2001)).
347. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S. BLINDING LASER WEAPONS (1995), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Us2.htm.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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1960s and early 1970s push to address weapons generally. Neither effort
saw any immediate success, yet each ultimately produced both widely accepted regulations and increasingly ratified prohibitions. Experience with
the two conventions prohibiting landmines and cluster munitions are particularly instructive as neither has yet achieved its ultimate goal of eradication. States that have invested most heavily in both landmines and cluster
munitions, the United States, Russia and China in particular, have proved
especially resistant to prohibitions, even in the face of growing stigma.
Whether States’ failure to deploy weapons actually results in regulation
or prohibition tolerance is undoubtedly tenuous. States are unlikely to develop, acquire or deploy weapons that obviously run afoul of law of war
principles. However, weapons widely deployed by States, such as landmines
and cluster munitions, have been regulated and in some cases prohibited
later after significant deployments. In this sense, deployment can account
for shifting senses of humanity, public opinion or even what constitutes
unnecessary suffering or discrimination.
D. Medical Compatibility
Weapons that produce wounds compatible with existing medical protocols
and capable of treatment by means available in military and field hospitals
have in many cases also proved resistant to regulation. For example, weapons, such as small arms projectiles, fragmentation devices and flechettes
that produce simple trauma have proved highly resistant to regulation. Military medical units and humanitarian organizations’ field hospitals are experienced at treating, and are usually equipped to treat, trauma wounds. Although innovations in physical trauma-producing weapons have repeatedly
provoked efforts at regulation, few weapons, with the possible exceptions
of landmines and cluster munitions, involving nothing more than increased
physical trauma treatable by prevailing standards of medical care have
yielded to meaningful regulation.
By contrast, weapons that produce wounds incompatible with—or that
frustrate or vex—prevailing protocols of medical care provided to war victims seem more tolerant or susceptible to regulation. Deliberate attempts
to devise means of inflicting wounds that evade or dangerously complicate
medical treatment seem highly likely to meet little resistance to regulation
from States.
Non-detectable fragments are a prime example of technology likely to
produce wounds incompatible with established medical capability and pro615
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tocols. Medical imaging used in military and humanitarian medical facilities
relies heavily on x-ray detection of metal fragments to treat battlefield
trauma. The tendency of undetectable fragments to evade this treatment
protocol and to require unconventional exploratory surgery surely informs
States receptivity to their prohibition. Similarly, barbed piercing weapons
have long been prohibited, not merely for the increased suffering associated with their removal, but also for their incompatibility with standard medical treatment protocols.
Admittedly, the characteristic of medical compatibility is not entirely
distinct from the well-recognized law of war principle of unnecessary suffering. That principle has long considered wound severity and treatment
prospects in its balancing calculus. It is also true that as a criterion for evaluating weapons, medical compatibility evokes memory of the failed SIrUS
Project’s medical standards for evaluating unnecessary suffering. However,
recognition of medical compatibility, while not itself a legal criterion, does
offer a helpful refinement of the principle of unnecessary suffering. Moreover, based on historical practice, medical compatibility seems to offer impressive predictive value. On initial examination, weapons producing medically challenging or novel wounds have proved marginally more tolerant of
regulation than those producing routinely treatable injury.
E. Disruptiveness
Concerns for the socially and militarily disruptive effects of weapons seem
to have motivated as many campaigns for law of war regulation as have
concerns for inhumane effects. States owing their power or momentary
hegemony to investments in existing military technologies have quite naturally sought to limit, by a range of means, including international law, other
States’ access to technology and weapons capable of disrupting that hegemony or displacing them from preeminence. Historical examples abound
of attempts to use law to achieve, sustain or artificially prolong military
technical advantages that could not be otherwise maintained in armories or
on the battlefield. Few, if any, of these efforts have proved successful. Disruptive weapons have nearly always managed to find their way to the battlefield. Potential for social or military disruptiveness, therefore, seems an
especially strong indicator of regulation resistance.
Possibly the earliest—and certainly the best known and most recounted—effort to regulate a militarily disruptive weapon is the Lateran Council’s ban on the crossbow. Although the Council’s edict invoked religion
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and concern for humanity, the ban is better explained as an effort to secure
the battlefield preeminence of mounted nobility. The ban never proved
effective. In subsequent centuries the crossbow inflicted not only enormously effective casualties, but also resulted in much of the social and military disruption that had concerned the Council. Although the crossbow
ban predated the present State-centric international legal order, the feudal
societies and orders that preceded States clearly rejected law of war regulation of this highly disruptive weapon.
Later efforts, similarly motivated to preempt or preclude disruptive
weapons, met fates much like that of the crossbow ban. After firearms
threatened the place of armored nobility—and later archers and other machine-powered weapons—efforts to ban them failed repeatedly. Submarines proved a highly disruptive threat to the naval supremacy and empire
of Great Britain, yet multiple efforts to ban them during the twentieth century failed. And nuclear weapons, perhaps the most disruptive of all weapons with their capacity to marginalize nearly any conventional weapon system, provoked stark exceptionalism from States—perhaps the strongest
regulation resistance yet demonstrated.
The ban on poison presents an interesting study in disruption and law
of war regulation. In addition to their capacity to instill fear in opposing
forces and inflict atrocious suffering, poisons proved especially effective at
disrupting social order. An important tool in assassinations, especially of
high-level military and political leaders, poisons would seem by the theory
offered here to have provoked a high degree of regulation resistance.
States’ relative tolerance for poison regulation may require a caveat to the
general experience of disruptive weapons’ regulation resistance. In defense
of disruption as an indicator of regulation resistance, however, poison’s
disruptive effects have tended to operate with respect to assassination rather than open combat. That is, while disruptive in a political sense, poison
may not have proved to be especially disruptive in a military or militarytechnical sense. The ban on its use and States’ relative restraint with respect
to poisons may, after all, prove less detrimental to the theory of weapon
disruptiveness.
F. Notoriety
Even in liberal democracies, decisions about weapon development, procurement and deployment are not usually made in public. Voters rarely
weigh in directly on the composition of their countries’ arsenals. Still, pub617
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lic opinion and public conscience have proved influential inputs in past
efforts to revise weapons law. In the still blossoming Information Age,
public perceptions of weapons and their effects are likely to be increasingly
influential forces in international regulation of weapons.
Historical experience reveals that some weapons have generated a
greater degree of public notoriety than others. In some cases, as perhaps
with poisons, public disapproval seems to have been sprung from innate
human reactions. In other cases, such as anti-personnel landmines and
cluster munitions, public notoriety and disapproval seems to have been
spawned and cultivated by highly engineered, coordinated and impressively
researched campaigns by civil society. As experience with landmines further indicates, even weapons with characteristics that typically indicate regulation resistance, such as high levels of deployment and effectiveness, can
be made regulation tolerant through patient and persistent lobbying to raise
their notoriety. Whether by genetic or social engineering, the public image
and resulting opinion of weapons have proved to greatly affect, and even
manipulate, weapons’ regulation tolerance or resistance.
G. Equivocations
As is true of most theories, to fully capture the complexity and enormity of
reality, the theory of regulation tolerance and regulation resistance offered
by this article must include some equivocations and concede some exceptions. Examination of an historical record as long and as varied as that of
weapons regulation prevents perfect coherence and consistency with any
theory.
First, as previously noted, weapons’ technical properties and characteristics are in no respect the exclusive determinates of whether States will
tolerate or resist an effort to regulate them through the law of war. Political, military, cultural, historical and religious factors may even take precedence over factors related to the weapon itself. And in cases when these
factors permit regulation, timing and even personalities may conspire either
to facilitate or frustrate weapons law formation. It must then be clearly
conceded that technical attributes and characteristics are but a few of many
inputs that bear on whether a weapon proves regulation tolerant or resistant.
Furthermore, merely identifying technologies as either regulation resistant or tolerant may be too simplistic. It is possible that a weapon may
be at once both resistant and tolerant of law of war regulation. That is, a
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technology may be quite resistant to any effort to ban entirely its use or
possession. Yet that same technology may simultaneously prove quite tolerant of efforts to develop limitations on its use through interpretation and
application of existing principles, rules or precautions applicable to attacks.
Poisons, again, present an interesting coincidence of characteristics. While
capable of great social and military disruption and therefore historically indicated to resist regulation, poisons also elicit strong human revulsion, are
often not compatible with medical treatment, and require deception and
secrecy that prevent them being used conspicuously—all indicators of
regulation tolerance.
Clearly then, some balancing is required in such cases. Strong showings
with respect to regulation-tolerant characteristics might overcome contrasting, yet on aggregate weaker, indications of regulation-resistance. It is
likely that the balance of these features, rather than any monolithic characterization, is responsible for a weapon’s tolerance or resistance to law of
war regulation. Even if this is correct, law of war legislators will surely find
value in exploring further the occurrence of these and perhaps other qualities in weapons identified for potential law of war regulation.
Finally, there is an underappreciated two-way street between law and
technology. While it is well understood that law influences the employment
and operation of new technology, it is less appreciated that technology very
often has a transformative effect on law. Confronted with new weapons
technology, the international legal community, particularly nongovernmental components, responds quickly to the question, “What can
law do to limit or control this technology?” That community devotes far
less attention to the question, “What does this technology do to existing
law?”
V.

CONCLUSION

Restraints on weapons may be a natural evolutionary phenomenon. Anthropological research suggests that early hominid extinctions may be attributable to an inability to control intra-species weapon use, rather than to
predation or warfare with other hominid species.350 Thus, development of
limitations on weapons and their use, expressed as cultural, ethical, legal or

350. O’CONNELL, supra note 108, at 24 (citing DOLF ZILLMAN, HOSTILITY AND AG99 (1980)).
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other norms, may even be a fundamental tool of human survival and species preservation.
Notwithstanding its importance, predicting how States will adapt the
law of war to weapons and military technological innovations has proved
an exceptionally difficult and complex task. States have wavered between
resort to principles and resort to specific rules with frustrating inconsistency. The prospects for genuine success at adapting the law to existing and
emerging weapons are greatly dependent on an understanding of the inner
workings of not only the technology of war, but also the processes, actors
and influences that have historically formed the law of war applicable to
weapons.
History and experience play extraordinarily useful roles in crafting theories to predict and evaluate new directions for weapons law. Indeed, a coherent and historically minded theory of law of war weapons regulation is
essential to crafting strategies for future regulations. Part of a comprehensive understanding of weapons law development has been the operation
and influence of underappreciated characteristics and attributes of weapons
themselves. Although application and understanding of the traditional law
of war principles explains a great deal of existing weapons law, the previously ignored attributes and criteria identified by this article may advance
understanding and contribute to more effective efforts to advance weapons
law. By charting both the history and methodology of weapons law with a
view toward identifying forces and influences that have made some weapons susceptible to international regulation and made others resistant, this
article offers a starting point for identifying sound investments of the very
precious diplomatic, political and financial capital required to produce
meaningful law of war developments.
Regulating weapons alone is by no means sufficient to strike a desirable
legal balance between humanity and military necessity. As Professor
Schmitt argued nearly a decade ago, detection platforms and fire control
systems are as important to achieving humanity in war—if not more so—
than the weapons they direct and guide.351 Regulation of the training, attributes and conduct of the armed forces that employ weapons may be
even more important facets of the international law of war. However, the
rapid pace with which increasingly sophisticated means of warfare are developed and produced ensures a critical role for the regulation of weapons.
351. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF
WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE 137, 142 (Anthony M.
Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies).
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Identifying characteristics and qualities of new technologies that history
indicates as contributing to either regulation tolerance or resistance is surely
a worthwhile endeavor.
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